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FROM MANDATES TO GOVERNANCE:  
RESTRUCTURING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
Brett H. McDonnell*
Matthew T. Bodie** 
Abstract: Employers are saddled with a dizzying array of responsibilities to their employees.  
Meant to advance a wide array of workplace policies, these demands have saddled employment 
with the burden of numerous social ends.  However, that system has increasingly come under 
strain, as companies seek to shed employment relationships and workers lose important 
protections when terminated.  In this Article, we propose that employers and employees should 
be given greater flexibility with a move from mandates to governance.  Many of the employment 
protections required from employers stem from employees’ lack of organizational power.  The 
imbalance is best addressed by providing workers with governance rights within the firm.  In 
exchange for these governance rights, governments can lift or relax many employment mandates.  
In addition, certain responsibilities currently assigned to employers will be lifted and placed on 
the larger society—where they would be more appropriately carried.  This rebalancing of the 
employment relationship will lead to a more economically secure and empowered populace 
while at the same time freeing businesses to better pursue their entrepreneurial endeavors. 
Introduction 
Once upon a time, labor advocates envisioned collective bargaining as a movement to 
advance industrial democracy. Workers would choose their collective representatives, and those 
unions would negotiate to protect worker interests and shape the terms and conditions of 
employment. In the latter half of the 20th Century that vision faded as unionization in the U.S. 
cratered.1 There was an explosion of regulation that has dramatically changed the employment 
relationship: minimum wage, overtime, antidiscrimination provisions, and health and safety 
protections, to name a few.  That regulation has replaced unionization as the prime legal strategy 
for protecting workers, but it can impose levels of complexity and rigidity that undermine its 
goals and result in uneven or lax enforcement.2  Even academics and regulators who advocate for 
greater worker protections recognize the costs of expanding these mandates.3 
Many employers chafe at these rules, and there have been increasing attempts to evade 
employment regulation. Notoriously, Uber and Lyft have treated their drivers as independent 
contractors rather than employees. In California, with a long reputation for an employee-friendly 
* Professor and Dorsey & Whitney Chair and Director, Institute for Law and Economics, University of
Minnesota Law School.
** Callis Family Professor and Co-Director, Wefel Center for Employment Law, Saint Louis University
School of Law.
1 Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1529 (2002).
2 See infra Part I.
3 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89 (2008) (raising
concerns about the multiplicity of state and local regimes).
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approach, the Supreme Court and legislature adopted a broad definition of “employee” that 
included ride sharing drivers and other “gig economy” workers. But Proposition 22, passed in 
November 2020, created a carve-out for platform drivers and provides a significantly limited set 
of company responsibilities. Companies have designs on bringing this categorization of platform 
workers to states across the nation.4 
During the post-war decades, corporate governance also evolved. It became widely-
accepted that corporations exist to maximize shareholder value.5 Protecting employees and other 
stakeholders was fine, but only if doing so would increase profits. If that leads to too little 
protection, then pass laws focused on worker protection. Corporate governance protects 
shareholders; employment regulation protects employees. 
But more recently, corporations are under increasing pressure to shift from that narrow 
focus on shareholders.  Last year’s announcement by the Business Roundtable supporting a 
stakeholder-oriented approach was just one notable example of a shift in business leaders 
towards acknowledging environmental concerns, antiracism efforts, and employee 
empowerment.6  But the Business Roundtable proposes no mechanisms for holding companies 
accountable for protecting stakeholders, including employees, and the status of the average 
American worker remains frustratingly stagnant.  The novel coronavirus pandemic has 
highlighted the disparity between workers, who face dangerous conditions and unemployment, 
and shareholders, who enjoyed the highest Dow Jones Industrial Average on record.7   
The success of Prop 22 was buoyed in part by the idea that platform workers should have 
more flexibility and control over their work, less encumbered by the strictures of traditional 
employment.  At the same time, business leaders and investors are recognizing the need to move 
beyond shareholder primacy in governing corporations.  These two trends support a new 
approach to work, one that provides workers with more power and employers with fewer 
regulatory requirements.  We suggest an exchange of governance power for employment 
mandates. 
4 Alex N. Press, With Prop 22’s Passage in California, Tech Companies Are Just Writing Their Own 
Laws Now, JACOBIN (Nov. 2020), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/11/proposition-22-california-uber-
lyft-gig-employee; Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Takes a Victory Lap on Prop 22 and Talks about Taking It 
National, VERGE, Nov. 5, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/5/21551136/uber-prop-22-victory-
national-q3-2020-earnings. 
5 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N. Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE (Sept. 13, 1970). 
6 Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, 
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/. 
7 Douglas MacMillan, Peter Whoriskey & Jonathan O'Connell, America’s biggest companies are 
Flourishing During the Pandemic and Putting Thousands of People Out of Work, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 
2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/business/50-biggest-companies-coronavirus-
layoffs/. 
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It is not new to suggest that self-governance is a better workplace model than mandatory 
terms.8  The original Wagner Act was built on the premise of industrial democracy, and various 
efforts at employee participation through quality circles, works council, and employee ownership 
have made appearances within our economic fabric.9  Several scholars this century have 
proposed regulatory flexibility for companies with employee representation, reflecting limited 
developments in regulatory practice.10 But we are piling more and more of our societal 
expectations onto employment just as its fissuring threatens the entire enterprise.  Workers join 
together to express their concerns about workplace safety, discrimination, and fair pay, while 
their employers are governed by expectations of profit maximization and labor-cost reduction.  
The chasm between employee power and corporate power is perhaps at its zenith, even while 
public sentiment turns in favor of greater worker empowerment. 
This article argues for reshaping the law of employment to emphasize employee 
empowerment within the firm and deemphasize legal mandates.  It builds upon recent work by 
scholars advocating regulatory flexibility11 by focusing more on the corporate governance 
implications and on the types of employee representation that could be used to invoke greater 
flexibility, and by considering a wider range of employment regulation that could be made 
flexible, including the link between a move to governance and parallel moves to provide some 
collective goods through government rather than through employers. In Part I we survey 
employment law. We describe the wide range and scope of legal mandates that employers face, 
and the difficulties that those mandates create for both employers and employees. We analyze 
how allowing firms that implement collective employee governance to modify some legal 
mandates may reduce the costs of those mandates while still protecting employees. 
Part II considers the corporate governance arguments for empowering employees. While 
employment law focuses on protecting employees, corporate governance affects the interests of 
many corporate stakeholders, such as shareholders, customers, creditors, local communities, and 
the environment. Employees participating in governance will affect the interests of all those 
stakeholders. The traditional American position is that those running corporations should focus 
exclusively on the interests of shareholders. We argue that position is wrong.  
Part III analyzes different forms of employee empowerment that employers could use to 
modify employment mandates. We consider three basic forms: union representation, shop floor 
governance such as works councils, and employee representation on the board of directors. Each 
form presents a way to significantly involve employee representatives in governance, allowing 
firms to achieve better tradeoffs in protecting employees at a reasonable cost to other 
8 CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 
23 (2010) (“This is not the first proposal to improve compliance with employment mandates by fostering 
new vehicles for employee representation.”).  
9 See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor 
Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 496 (1993) (discussing the role of democratic governance as an organizing 
principle for the Wagner Act). 
10 ESTLUND, supra note 8; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 407-23 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205 (2001). 
11 See id. and accompanying text. 
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stakeholders than is achieved by our complex system of employment law mandates. Each form 
has its advantages and disadvantages. Any one of them, if instituted with adequate protections, 
should allow employers to modify some employment regulatory mandates. 
What mandates should employers be able to modify? Part IV provides a brief outline, 
touching on but not resolving many issues. A variety of employment law rules, including 
minimum wage, workplace safety, pension protections, health insurance mandates, and possibly 
even antidiscrimination rules could be modified. Mostly we do not suggest completely 
eliminating a particular mandate, but rather allowing employers with employee involvement to 
modify the mandate within limits, or changing the process by which the mandate is enforced. We 
draw a connection between modifying mandates through governance and changing the locus of 
responsibility for some matters from employers to government. For example, were the state to 
institute a substantial universal basic income, then it would be more feasible to allow empowered 
employees to agree to wages well below the minimum wage level. 
Part IV also considers how moving from mandates to governance would affect, and be 
affected by, the growth of platform companies and other forms of employment disintermediation 
and the related debate over defining who is an “employee.” The greater flexibility of governance 
may help protect workers such as drivers at Uber or Lyft while allowing their employer to avoid 
the most burdensome regulatory consequences of treating such workers as employees. But, such 
disintermediated workplaces raise serious doubts as to whether our arguments favoring worker 
empowerment apply as well in such businesses. We are left with open questions, but still the 
hope that moving from mandates to governance may improve regulatory options for an important 
and growing segment of the economy. 
I. The Role of Employers as Aggregators of Responsibilities
In corporate governance, the term “employer” is not legally meaningful.  The 
responsibilities of various parties within the corporate form do not change based on whether the 
corporation is considered an employer.  But in a variety of other areas—labor and employment 
law, certainly, but also tax, intellectual property, and tort—the law ascribes certain obligations 
on employers that are different than other entities.  As a result, the role of employer has become 
a legally meaningful one, and entities have taken great pains to try to avoid being labeled as 
such.12  In this Part we first examine the legal responsibilities placed on employers and discuss 
the differences between the mandatory and default approaches to these rules.  We consider why 
employment is such a meaningful category for these responsibilities and then discuss the 
competing considerations that come from the regulation of labor through mandates in both 
positive and negative ways.  
A. Legal Obligations Imposed on Employers
12 For an in-depth discussion of efforts to avoid the employment relationship, see DAVID WEIL, THE 
FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014). 
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 A complex network of laws—state and federal; statutory, regulatory, and common-law—
create the set of responsibilities imposed on employers and employees as part of the employment 
relationship.  Below is a brief overview of the obligations that employers assume when they 
create an employment relationship. 
1. Collective representation
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)13 is the closest that labor and employment 
regulation comes to addressing the management and governance of the employer.  Under the 
NLRA, the employer (whatever its organizational form) must bargain with its employees’ chosen 
representative over the employees’ terms and conditions of employment.14  A complex array of 
subsidiary obligations flow from this central one, such as the prohibition against employer 
discipline or discharge because of an employee’s protected concerted activity.15  The employer 
need not agree to any specific set of terms, but it must bargain in good faith and abide by the 
complex system of federal labor law for managing this bargaining relationship.  Unlike other 
duties imposed upon employers within the employment relationship, the duty to bargain does not 
require minimum employment terms or impose substantive obligations on the employer’s 
business.  Instead, the NLRA requires employers to negotiate with employees as a group and 
prohibits individual contracts.16  Framers of the NLRA intended to introduce a form of 
“industrial democracy” and provide employees with a voice at the workplace.17   
2. Compensation and Benefits
Employee compensation is regulated both as to the amount and the process.  As to the 
amount, federal law requires employers to provide a minimum.18  and pay certain categories of 
employees one-and-a-half times their hourly wages if they work over forty hours per week.19  
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. 
14 Id. §158(a)(5) (holding it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees”). 
15 See id. § 158(a)(1), (3). 
16 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (“The very purpose of providing by statute for the 
collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which 
reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group.”). 
17 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: HEARINGS ON S. 1958 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON 
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 642 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1617, at 2028 (1949) (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner 
that “[t]hat is just the very purpose of this legislation, to provide industrial democracy”). 
18 See 29 U.S.C. § 206. There are limited exceptions to this requirement for workers under 20 years of age 
who are new to the job, id. § 206(g).  Restaurant servers get a significantly reduced minimum wage as 
long as customer-paid gratuities make up the difference. See id. § 203(m). 
19 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207.  The big exceptions for overtime pay fall into so-called “white collar” 
categories—professional, executive, and administrative workers.  Id. § 213(a)(1) (exempting those 
“employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity”).  Other exemptions include 
certain types of farm workers, id. § 213(a)(6), employees of seasonal amusement or educational centers, 
id. § 213(a)(3), and computer programmers, id. § 213(a)(17). 
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State and local minimum wage laws often go well above the federal minimums.20  In terms of the 
manner of compensation, wage payment regulations require that employees be paid regularly and 
that they be paid for all time worked, regardless of the length of term.21  Along with employer 
wage payment duties under the common law,22 federal and state statutes require timely wage 
payments and divisible portions.23   
With respect to pension benefits,24 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)25 
does not require that employers provide pension or welfare benefits, but it does provide 
mandatory standards when they are provided26  The Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA to 
borrow principles from the law of trusts with respect to fiduciary obligations.27  Specifically, the 
administrator of an ERISA plan has the same responsibilities as a trustee when it comes to 
administering the plan.28  The statutory scheme provides for four primary fiduciary duties: the 
duty of loyalty to plan participants,29 the duty of prudence,30 the duty of prudent diversification 
of plan assets,31 and the duty to follow plan terms.32  In addition, there are specific requirements 
about the operation of the plan, such as vesting.33  The upside of this complicated regulatory 
scheme is a set of tax savings for both employer and employee.  However, this tax savings is 
20 See Irene Lurie, Enforcement of State Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws: Resources, Procedures, and 
Outcomes, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 411, 436 (2011) (providing a table of state minimum wage and 
overtime laws as of 2010). 
21 See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 3.01 cmt. b (2015) (“Many states have wage-payment 
laws that determine the mode and frequency of payment.”). 
22 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 3.01-3.05 (2015); see, e.g., id. § 3.01(b) (“Whether 
compensation has been earned is determined by the agreement on compensation between the employer 
and employee or any relevant binding promise or binding policy statement on compensation made by the 
employer.”). 
23 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (requiring the payment of minimum wages and overtime based on 
specific periods of work); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-502 (requiring employees to be paid at least 
every two weeks or wice in a month); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 148 (requiring the payment of 
wages within a week of the worker’s pay period). 
24 Health and safety benefits are discussed below in Part I.A.4. 
25 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). 
26 Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 516 (2010) (“Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that employees 
would receive the benefits they had earned, but Congress did not require employers to establish benefit 
plans in the first place.”). 
27 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA's legislative history confirms 
that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions codify and make applicable to ERISA fiduciaries certain 
principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.” (citations and quotations omitted)). 
28 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008) (stating that courts “should analogize a 
plan administrator to the trustee of a common-law trust” and “should consider a benefit determination to 
be a fiduciary act”). 
29 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (also known as the exclusive benefit rule). 
30 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
31 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C). 
32 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D). 
33 See, e.g., id.  § 1053 (providing for minimum vesting standards for employee retirement accounts). 
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only available if the employer offers the benefits to a sufficiently broad number of employees—a 
doctrine known as “nondiscrimination.”34  
3. Limitations on discipline and termination
The “employment at will” rule, which is the default rule in all states except Montana, 
dictates that employment is terminable at any time, with or without cause.35  As a default rule, at 
will employment can be changed contractually.36  The common law of tort provides for 
additional protections against wrongful discharges in violation of public policy.37  The employer 
has a duty not to fire an employee because the employee refused to violate the law in the course 
of employment,38 or because the employee abided by professional codes of ethics or conduct.39  
The protections also extend to employees who report on employer wrongdoing, either up the 
chain within the employer or directly to outsiders such a government agencies or media 
members.40  Employer discretion is also bounded by numerous antidiscrimination statutory 
schemes that apply to employer termination or discipline.  Federal law protects employees from 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, religion, age, and disability.41  
State and local laws provide additional protections for these categories.42 
When employees are discharged otherwise lawfully, state law provides for 
unemployment compensation for a set period of time.43  Although states manage their own 
systems, as a general rule they require employers to pay into an unemployment insurance fund 
34 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(1)(A) (requiring that the plan benefit at least seventy percent of employees 
who are not highly compensated employees).  ERISA’s so-called “nondiscrimination” requirements 
endeavor to achieve the “social policy goal of ensuring that the employer’s rank and file employees 
benefit from the employer’s qualified plan.”  COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 164 (4th ed. 2015).   
35 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (2015). 
36 See, e.g., id. § 2.02 (providing for contractual exceptions to at-will); § 2.03 (explaining cause 
requirements for contractual agreements for employment as to a definite term); § 2.05 (explaining the role 
of employer policy statements within the employment agreement); § 2.07 (discussing the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing within the employment relationship). 
37 Id. § 5.01. 
38 Id. § 5.02(a). 
39 Id. § 5.02(e). 
40 Id. § 5.02(e) cmt. f. 
41 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (making it an unlawful practice to “discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (providing similar 
protections against age discrimination within the employment relationship); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
(providing similar protections against disability discrimination); Bostock v. Clayton Co., 590 U.S. ___ 
(2020) (finding that Title VII covers discrimination based on sexual orientation). 
42 1 MICHAEL B. SNYDER, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS § 8:4 (2016) (“Nearly every state has a fair 
employment practice (FEP) law, and most states also have their own administrative agencies to 
investigate charges of discrimination and enforce these FEP laws. Almost 200 local jurisdictions also 
have FEP laws and companion enforcement agencies.”). 
43 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 1051 (7th ed. 2011) (“Fifty states, 
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have individual unemployment insurance (UI) programs 
determining the length of unemployment insurance benefits and their amounts for qualifying recipients.”). 
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and require compensation when the employee is terminated unless the employee has quit or has 
engaged in significant malfeasance.44  During the pandemic, the federal government provided an 
addition $600 a week in unemployment up through the end of July and also provided assistance 
to independent contractors through a federal fund.45   
4. Health and Safety
Under the common law, employers have a duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace 
and warnings for dangerous working conditions.46  The federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSHA)47 imposes on employers a general duty to provide safe working conditions.48  In 
addition to this general duty, OSHA enforces a complex regulatory framework as established 
through promulgated occupational safety and health standards.49  When one employee harms 
another as a result of tortious behavior, the employer is liable if that tort was committed within 
the employee’s scope of employment or if the employer later ratifies the conduct.50  Employers 
also have a common law duty to exercise care in selecting, retaining, and supervising its 
employees,51 and they are liable for harm to employees caused by their failure to exercise 
reasonable care in these responsibilities.52   
Under workers’ compensation laws, employers are responsible for workplace injuries that 
require medical treatment and may result in employee disability.53  The workers’ compensation 
model represents a bargain between employer and employees, struck by state legislatures: 
employees are covered for all workplace injuries without having to prove employer fault, and 
44 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/2020/complete.pdf. 
45 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES), Pub. L. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).  
46 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 (2015).  The duty has been recognized in all U.S. 
jurisdictions.  See id. at Reporters’ Notes for cmt. a.   
47 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678. 
48 See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (requiring employers to “furnish to each of his employees employment and a 
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards”). 
49 Id. § 654(a)(2). 
50 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03(a) & (b) (2015). 
51 Id. § 4.04. 
52 See, e.g., Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ohio 1991) (“[A]n employer may be liable 
for failing to take appropriate action where that employer knows or has reason to know that one of its 
employees poses an unreasonable risk of harm to other employees.”); Retherford v. A.T. & T. 
Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 973 (Utah 1992) (describing the elements of a 
claim of negligent employment). 
53 Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 50, 53-59 (1967) (tracing the evolution of workers' compensation insurance in the 
United States). 
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employers are only liable for statutory damages based on medical care and degree of disability.54  
States often require employers to carry workers compensation insurance.55 
When workers are dealing with medical emergencies, federal law requires unpaid leave 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).56  Employees are given up to twelve weeks of 
unpaid leave a year for family or medical leave and are allowed to return to their job or an 
equivalent position.57  Eight states and the District of Columbia have paid family or medical 
leave statutes;58 thirteen states and D.C. have paid sick leave requirements.59  Federal plans for 
paid sick leave have been proposed by both parties and may soon see enactment.60 
Until recently, health insurance plans were regulated primarily by state law, with ERISA 
providing only framework protections.61  However, the Affordable Care Act created a new set of 
incentives and requirements for employers with respect to such insurance.  The employer 
mandate requires employers of a certain size to purchase health insurance for their employees or 
provide funding for employees to buy their insurance on state exchanges.62  If employers fail to 
do so, they must pay a tax penalty.  Despite fears that the ACA would drive employers out of the 
54 Shauhin Talesh, Insurance Law as Public Interest Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 985, 1001 (2012) (“[T]he 
workers' compensation system emerged from a desire to create a new, workable, and predictable mode of 
handling accident liability that balanced the interests of labor and management.”).   
55 Anthony J. Barkume & John W. Ruser, Deregulating Property-Casualty Insurance Pricing: The Case 
of Workers' Compensation, 44 J.L. & ECON. 37, 43 (2001) (noting that “states generally require workers' 
compensation insurance coverage”). 
56 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. 
57 Id. § 2612(a)(1). 
58 National Conference of State Legislatures, Paid Family Leave Resources, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/paid-family-leave-resources.aspx (noting the 
passage of paid family leave laws in California (2002), New Jersey in (2009), Rhode Island (2014), New 
York (2016), Washington state (2017), Washington D.C. (2017), Massachusetts (2018), Connecticut 
(2019) and Oregon (2019)). 
59 National Conference of State Legislatures, Paid Sick Leave, https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/paid-sick-leave.aspx (noting the passage or voter approval of sick-leave laws in Connecticut 
(2011), California (2014), Massachusetts (2014), Oregon (2015), Vermont (2016),  Arizona (2016), 
Washington (2016) Rhode Island (2017), Maryland, (2018), New Jersey (2018), Michigan (2018), 
Nevada (2019) and Maine (2019)). 
60 See Healthy Families Act, H.R. 1286, 113th Cong., March 20, 2013, 
http://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1286 (requiring employers to permit each 
employee to earn at least 1 hour of paid sick time for every 30 hours worked); Presidential Memorandum, 
Modernizing Federal Leave Policies for Childbirth, Adoption and Foster Care to Recruit and Retain 
Talent and Improve Productivity, Jan. 15, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/01/15/presidential-memorandum-modernizing-federal-leave-policies-childbirth-ad; Miranda 
Bryant, Congress Is 'Better Poised than Ever' to Pass Paid Family Leave Bill, Lawmakers Say, 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 6, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/06/paid-family-medical-leave-
bill-congress. 
61 Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of Mandated 
Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1363-74. 
62 The employer mandate is developed in 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.  For a brief overview of the employer 
mandate, see Suja A. Thomas & Peter Molk, Employer Costs and Conflicts Under the Affordable Care 
Act, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 56, 58-59 (2013). 
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health insurance market,63 there has only been incremental movement away from providing 
insurance despite rising premiums.64 
5. Tax responsibilities
Firms are also given responsibility for their employees when it comes to taxes.  
Employers must withhold their employees’ taxes65 and must pay a share of Social Security and 
Medicare (FICA)66 and unemployment (FUTA) taxes.67  The IRS defines employees based on 
the common law control test.68  Employer withholding is extremely important to the public fisc; 
payroll taxes alone make up 34 percent of all federal revenues.69  And the consequences of an 
employer misclassification can be extremely costly, as the business is then subject to the 
mandatory back-tax formula.70 
B. Employment as Locus of Regulation
The legal obligations that employers must shoulder hinge on the concept of employment.  
Only employees are entitled to this specific set of legal obligations.  The concept of employee 
dates back to the idea of “servant” in master and servant law.  Under the common law of agency, 
masters are responsible for the torts of their servants if those torts were committed within the 
scope of employment.71  It is in this sense that “responsibility” was first imposed on employers.  
63 See Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping 
Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 127 (2011) (“[C]ommentators have generally focused on the 
prospect that employers will choose to drop health coverage entirely when ACA's core reforms are 
implemented in 2014.”).   
64 See Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits: 2020 Survey, Oct. 8, 2020, 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-2020-Annual-Survey.pdf (showing that 
the percentage of firms offering health benefits has only dropped from 59% in 2009 to 56% in 2020).  For 
a discussion of how the ACA has changed American norms about government’s role in healthcare, see 
Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment, 108 GEO. L.J. 495, 496 
(2020). 
65 26 U.S.C. §§ 3401(c), 3402. 
66 Id. §§ 3101, 3121(d). 
67 Id. §§ 3301, 3306(i). 
68 Id. § 3121(d)(2) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any individual who, under the 
usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of 
an employee”); 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (finding an employment relationship “when the person for 
whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, 
not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that 
result is accomplished”); see 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) (stating that “the term ‘employee’ has the meaning 
assigned to such term by section 3121(d)”); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298–99 (laying out a 
twenty factor test to aid in “determining whether an individual is an employee under the common law 
rules”). 
69 Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Federal Payroll Taxes, April 2, 2014, 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes. 
70 26 U.S.C. § 3509(a). In fact, Congress was moved to create a safe harbor.  Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2885.
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
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It was not until the Third Restatement of Agency that the official change from master and servant 
to employer and employee was recognized.72 
The federal legislation of the New Deal infused the concept of employment with specific 
regulatory responsibilities. In defining who fit the definition, this legislation took two approaches.  
Many statutes, such as the National Labor Relations Act, did not provide a definition of the term 
“employee.”73  The NLRA did not originally exclude independent contractors, and both the 
National Labor Relations Board and the Supreme Court originally held that so-called 
“newsboys” were statutory employees for purposes of the Act, even though they were considered 
independent contractors.74  However, Congress rejected this interpretation of the Act and added 
independent contractors specifically to the list of excluded categories.75  The Board then adopted 
the common-law right to control test in excluding independent contractors.  The Supreme Court 
sanctioned this test in NLRB v. United Insurance Co.,76 making clear that the Board had a range 
of discretion in implementing the test.  Over time, the common law test for employment has 
become the statutory definition if that statute itself leaves the term undefined.77 
Using a different approach, the Federal Labor Standards Act defines “employ” to include 
“suffer or permit to work.”78  Because employ is defined differently and more broadly, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the FLSA may extend to cover workers beyond the reach of 
the common law agency test.79 This approach, knows as the “economic realities” or “economic 
dependence” test, is generally interpreted to provide a more expansive definition to the term 
“employee.”  The term “employee” was “to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by 
underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal 
classifications.”80  That reference to “economic facts” became “economic reality” in later cases 
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006) (defining an employee as “an agent whose 
principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent's performance of work”). 
73 Excluded employees include: agricultural workers, domestically-employed healthcare or family care 
employees, public-sector employees, railroad, airline, and other transportation workers covered by the 
Railway Labor Act (RLA), independent contractors, and supervisors.  29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
74 N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).  The Court explicitly rejected the common 
law distinction between employees and independent contractors, holding that the news vendors in 
question were “subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradicate.” 
Id. at 127. 
75 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  See Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 
61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§141-197 (2006)) (amending the NLRA to exclude 
independent contractors). 
76 390 U.S. 254 (1968).  Noting that “[t]here are innumerable situations which arise in the common law 
where it is difficult to say whether a particular individual is an employee or an independent contractor," the 
Court required courts to uphold reasonable determinations “even though a court would justifiably have 
made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Id. at 258, 260. 
77 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (interpreting the scope of the 
work-for-hire doctrine); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (interpreting the 
definition of “employee” under ERISA). 
78 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
79 See Darden, 503 U.S. at 326 (noting that the FLSA “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some 
parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles”). 
80 N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944). 
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defining the category of “employee” in the context of the Social Security Act81 and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA).82  According to the “economic realities” test, “employees are those who as 
a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render service.”83  In 
recognition of the FLSA’s broader coverage, courts have either implicitly or explicitly looked to 
the “reality” of the workers’ dependence on the putative employer.84  The focus on economic 
reality is meant to cut through formalistic trappings to get at the heart of the relationship.85 
Despite these dueling definitional approaches, the concept of employment has been fairly 
stable over time.  It remains the most important economic relationship for most adults, with 
almost two-thirds working as employees.86  Because of its centrality, it has been used as a nexus 
of economic regulation covering a range of public policies. These obligations have incentivized a 
fair amount of regulatory arbitrage to try to avoid the employment relationship.87  The much-
heralded gig or platform economy is at the forefront of this shift, with millions of workers 
shifting to more flexible and online work arrangements.88 Proposition 22 in California has 
completely upended the efforts of the California Supreme Court and the state legislature to 
categorize these workers as employees.  With momentum at their back, platform companies are 
now reviewing their options in pushing for a non-employee agenda across the country.89  The 
stable consensus on the meaning of employment and its consequences may be on the verge of 
complete destabilization. 
C. Difficulties for employers and workers
81 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947) (“We concluded that, since that end was the elimination 
of labor disputes and industrial strife, ‘employees' included workers who were such as a matter of economic 
reality.” (discussing N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944)). 
82 Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-Op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (holding that “the ‘economic reality’ 
rather than ‘technical concepts' is to be the test of employment”).   
83 Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (interpreting tax provisions), quoted in Mednick v. 
Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975) (interpreting the FLSA). 
84 Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing 
economic dependence as “the focus of all the other considerations”); Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 346 (“As a matter 
of economic reality, the Sales Leaders were dependent upon Cornerstone to such an extent that they could 
not plausibly be considered ‘in business for [themselves].’”). 
85 Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299-302 (5th Cir.1975) (characterizing the ultimate 
inquiries as: “Is [the worker] the kind of person meant to be protected by the F.L.S.A.? Is he dependent 
upon finding employment in the business of others . . ., (one of) those who themselves are least able in good 
times to make provisions for their needs when old age and unemployment may cut off their earnings?” 
(quotations omitted)). 
86 Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release: Work Experience of the Population—2019, Dec. 19, 2020, 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/work.pdf (finding that 168 million people worked during 2019). 
87 In fact, many of these companies are engaging in “regulatory entrepreneurship”—pursuing a line of 
business in which changing the law is a significant part of the business plan.  Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan 
M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017).
88 Uri Berliner, Jobs In The Pandemic: More Are Freelance And May Stay That Way Forever, NPR.ORG
(Sept. 16, 2020 7:50 a.m.), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/16/912744566/jobs-in-the-pandemic-more-are-
freelance-and-may-stay-that-way-forever; COVID-19 Is Accelerating the Rise of the Digital Economy,
BDO.COM, May 2020, https://www.bdo.com/insights/business-financial-advisory/strategy,-technology-
transformation/covid-19-is-accelerating-the-rise-of-the-digital-e.
89 See Press, supra note 4; Hawkins, supra note 4.
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Even if workplace regulations are justified from a perspective of equity and fairness, they 
still exact a cost.  The standard complaint from employers concerns the breadth and depth of 
regulations concerning the employment relationship.  Although not often the subject of legal 
scholarship, the complexity of workplace laws is well-recognized.90  This is not to say that U.S. 
employment regulation is unusually burdensome internationally; most nations provide more 
significant restrictions on employer discretion particularly with regard to termination.91  But the 
United States has been accreting additional layers of obligations upon the employment 
relationship fairly continuously since the New Deal, and there are many complex features to 
workplace law. 
Just to provide one example, the Family and Medical Leave Act requires unpaid leave for 
up to twelve weeks a year for family or medical reasons while permitting the employee to return 
to an equivalent position after the leave.92  This requirement sounds straightforward and supports 
an important societal policy of care for oneself and one’s family.  But the translation of statute 
into action can be quite uncertain.  First, along with the birth or adoption of a child, employees 
are provided with leave if they have a “serious health condition  that makes the employee unable 
to perform the functions of the position,” or if they need to care for a close relative with a serious 
health condition.93  The statute defines a serious health condition as “an illness, injury, 
impairment, or physical or mental condition” that involves either hospitalization or “continuing 
treatment by a health care provider.”94  The regulations differentiate between treatment that 
includes a course of prescription drugs, which would be covered, and a course of over-the-
counter drugs, which would not be covered.95  The regulations further define a serious health 
condition involving continuing treatment by a health care provider to require “a period of 
incapacity of more than three consecutive, full calendar days,” along with subsequent treatment 
“two or more times, within 30 days of the first day of incapacity” or “on at least one occasion, 
which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care 
provider.”96  Often it will not be clear at the onset of the illness whether it meets the 
90 STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTIVES: BRINGING 
WORKPLACE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY INTO FOCUS 130 (2009) (calling the U.S. system “a complex 
maze of common law doctrines and individual statutes on varied employment and labor law topics from 
racial discrimination to whistleblowing, from childbirth leave to Social Security benefits, from workplace 
safety to collective bargaining, from explicit minimum wage standards to tax subsidies for private health 
insurance”);  Hirsch, supra note 3, at 89  (“The laws and regulations governing the American workplace 
reveal a level of complexity and uncertainty that rivals virtually any other area of law.”). 
91 Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing American 
Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 445-46 (2014) (noting that countries within their survey “typically 
have either general just-cause provisions or enumerated lists of lawful or unlawful reasons for 
dismissal”); Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment 
Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73 (2007). 
92 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
93 Id.  
94 Id. § 2611(11). 
95 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c).   
96 Id. § 825.115(a).  The provision further requires that the “requirement in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of 
this section for treatment by a health care provider means an in-person visit to a health care provider. The 
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requirements of a serious health condition.97  The employer must also determine if employees are 
eligible for FMLA leave.  The employee must have worked at least 1,250 hours during the 
previous 12-month period,98 must not be a key employee,99 and must be one of at least 50 
employees within a 75-mile radius of the particular worksite.100  Other complications include the 
timing and categorization of employee leave, the use of paid leave, and the interaction between 
the FMLA and the ADA.101  Not surprisingly, human resource professionals find FMLA leave to 
be very challenging to properly track, label, and provide notice to employees.102 
Our network of regulations become manifold more complex when we consider state 
regulations.  These regulations make things significantly more complicated for firms with 
geographic distribution of employees.  As Jeffrey Hirsch has argued: 
Most employers are at least regional, if not national and international, in scope. 
Even many small businesses either compete or have a presence in numerous 
jurisdictions. States' current authority over much of the workplace fails to 
acknowledge this reality, and this failure comes at a cost. At best, multiple layers 
of regulations create complexities and redundancies that increase compliance 
costs and make enforcement more difficult. At worst, inconsistencies or outright 
conflict make compliance and enforcement nearly impossible.103 
Taking one of these sets of laws, Hirsch has argued that termination protections are “numerous, 
complex, and unnecessarily confusing,” with over twenty-five different federal statute and rules 
from every state and numerous localities.104 
The complexity of modern workplace regulation hampers the enforcement of these 
requirements.  Workers must know and understand the law’s provisions in order to understand 
their rights.  If the laws are too complex, workers will not grasp when they are entitled to 
first (or only) in-person treatment visit must take place within seven days of the first day of incapacity.”  
Id. § 825.115(c).  
97 Compare Caldwell v. Holland of Texas, Inc., 208 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a child’s sudden 
onset of an ear infection may have been a serious health condition) with Weidema v. State Dep't of 
Transp., No. A11-1397, 2012 WL 2873942, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 16, 2012) (finding a biopsy for a 
potentially cancerous cyst was not a serious health condition when the cyst was revealed to be benign). 
98 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2). 
99 Id. § 2614(b). A key employee is defined as “a salaried eligible employee who is among the highest 
paid 10 percent of the employees employed by the employer within 75 miles of the facility at which the 
employee is employed.”  Id. § 2614(b)(2).  Key employees can be denied reinstatement to their previous 
position if “such denial is necessary to prevent substantial and grievous economic injury to the operations 
of the employer.” Id. § 2614(b)(1)(A). 
100 Id. § 2611(2). 
101 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW 282-83 (2008). 
102 Stephen Miller, HR Professionals Struggle over FMLA Compliance, SHRM Tells the DOL, 
SHRM.ORG, Sept. 21, 2020, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/hr-
professionals-struggle-over-fmla-compliance-shrm-tells-the-dol.aspx (discussing “many of the challenges 
and frustrations that confront HR professionals as they comply with the [FMLA]”). 
103 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 225, 228 (2008). 
104 Hirsch, supra note 3, at 95 (describing these laws as “the result of incrementalism run amok”). 
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protection and when they are not.  They may fail to consult with attorneys—a necessary step, 
since many provisions are enforced through private rights of action.105  Complexity even foils 
attorneys. A study of briefs by plaintiffs’ attorneys in employment cases found that many 
attorneys failed to raise important claims or rebuttals to defenses in their briefs.106  Judges were 
not immune either, making mistakes on basic principles of doctrine.107  At some point an 
overload causes systems to crash, rendering them unable to provide the workplace fairness that 
the law would seem to enact. 
The rise of human resources management as a field is symptomatic of the growth of 
complexity in employment regulation.  HR is now its own recognized field of learning.108  The 
human resources field started with the premise that poor management practices were ultimately 
at fault for the rift between management and labor.109  As the field has developed, it has focused 
more on increasing firm value.110  Although the field is not focused solely on legal compliance, 
the focus on these matters is undeniably their responsibility, at least at an initial level.111  The 
Society for Human Resource Management (“SHRM”) boasts a global membership of over 
300,000, and it regularly weighs in with Supreme Court amicus briefs and regulatory comments 
on labor and employment issues.112  With its own set of classes, certifications, and information 
network, SHRM serves as the hub for a large set of professionals devoted at least in significant 
part to making sure that employers follow the law. 
The purpose of these regulations and the firm infrastructure that enforces compliance 
with it is to protect employees and provide them with a higher level of benefits from 
employment.  But the either-or aspect of employment protections may in fact harm workers as 
well.  In rare instances, an individual worker may rationally prefer independent contractor 
105 Id. at 99.   
106 Scott A. Moss, Bad Briefs, Bad Law, Bad Markets: Documenting the Poor Quality of Plaintiffs' Briefs, 
Its Impact on the Law, and the Market Failure It Reflects, 63 EMORY L.J. 59, 63 (2013) (finding that “the 
vast majority of plaintiffs' briefs omit available caselaw rebutting key defense arguments and lose at more 
than double the rate of competent briefs”). 
107 Id.at 66-67 (“[S]ome judges just get it wrong, eagerly granting summary judgment in defiance of Rule 
56 standards that are too established to blame the lawyers.”). 
108 As a recent president of the Society of Human Resource Management (SHRM) said, “Perhaps the 
greatest human resources accomplishment . . . has been the worldwide recognition that human resources 
management is, indeed, a profession with a clearly defined body of knowledge.”  Michael R. Losey, 
Mastering the Competencies of HR Management, 38 HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 99, 99-100 (1999). 
109 BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE ORIGINS & EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 25 (1993). 
110 Sanford M. Jacoby, A Century of Human Resources Management, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TO 
HUMAN RESOURCES AND BEYOND: THE EVOLVING PROCESS OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS MANAGEMENT 
147, 165 (Bruce E. Kaufman, Richard A. Beaumont & Roy B. Helfgott eds., 2003). 
111 Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 159, 161 (2013). 
112 SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., ABOUT SHRM, https://www.shrm.org/about-shrm/pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2021). 
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status.113  But the package of benefits that accrue with employment status means that almost 
every worker would be better off as an employee rather than an independent contractor.  As a 
result, the line between employment and alternative statuses becomes increasingly high stakes.  
Getting employment status means getting all the benefits that society imparts upon employees.  
Others are left out.  We have seen this division in other employment circumstances.  For 
example, in the post-bankruptcy General Motors negotiations, the United Auto Workers 
consented to a split between then-current workers and future employees in which the later 
workers received significantly less in pay and benefits.114  In academia, because tenured 
professors enjoy such significant employment protections, there is growing pressure to hire 
nontenured faculty to teach a larger and larger percentage of courses.115  Under these 
circumstances, the workplace can become divided into haves and have-nots, where one set of 
workers have significantly more privileged circumstances than others.  The 
employee/independent contractor divide is one of these chasms. 
Since these divides within the workforce often favor incumbent workers, more senior 
workers, and more traditional workers, they can disproportionately burden younger, less senior, 
and more diverse workforce participants.  Julie Suk has argued that job security protections can 
exacerbate racial inequality in employment, leading to tensions such as the 2005 riots and 
student protests against proposed labor law changes in France.116  The larger the burden of hiring 
new workers, the less likely employers will be to hire new workers.  This stasis can slow the rate 
of social change and frustrate a workforce that would otherwise receive a higher number of 
opportunities. 
This description of the cons of employment regulation has painted with a broad brush.  
The intent is to frame some of the common costs and concerns raised by our admittedly 
byzantine system.  But there are strong arguments for employment regulations as well. 
D. Arguments for regulations
We have seen that the legal rules imposed on employers are extensive and onerous. For 
the most part the rules are mandatory, not default rules that can be changed by individual 
113 ESTREICHER & LESTER, supra note 101, at 14-15 (discussing that some workers might prefer to sue in 
tort for an injury rather than being limited to workers compensation, or may prefer to avoid the fiduciary 
obligations against competition through employment). 
114 Phoebe Wall Howard, UAW: 'Pay hasn't caught up with inflation' after 'bankruptcy sacrifices', 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/2019/09/27/gm-strike-
mary-barra-pay-uaw-wages/3776066002/ (discussing the differences in pay between workers hired before 
and after 2007). 
115 Colleen Flaherty, A Non-Tenure-Track Profession?, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Oct. 12, 2018, 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/12/about-three-quarters-all-faculty-positions-are-tenure-
track-according-new-aaup (finding that about three-quarters of all faculty positions are off the tenure 
track).  
116 Suk, supra note 91, at 76 (“The historical and current sociological data support the conclusion that the 
Labor Code's employee job security protections have contributed significantly to employers' propensity to 
engage in both rational and irrational discrimination against racial minorities in hiring.”).. 
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employers.117 They create significant costs, most obviously for employers, but sometimes for 
employees as well. What sorts of arguments justify these rules? And do those arguments justify 
making the rules mandatory? The arguments obviously vary for different rules, but there are a 
core set of types of arguments that are widely invoked in justifying these extensive mandatory 
employment rules. 
At the broadest and most philosophical level, many are concerned with promoting the 
autonomy of employees. Many see the employment relationship as one of dominance of 
employees by their employers.118 Such domination is inherently objectionable under a liberal 
worldview that emphasizes the ability of all to act autonomously in choosing how to live their 
lives. Domination may also lead to outcomes that disadvantage employees, because they have 
little bargaining power in setting the employment contract. The arguments that follow can be 
understood as providing more detailed understanding of elements of this general concern with 
autonomy and domination. 
One important source of inequality in the employment relationship is that in many ways 
employees are likely to have more limited information than employers,119 particularly when one 
compares the information available to individual employees with those available to an employer 
that is a relatively large and sophisticated organization. Most employees are not likely to have 
access to information about the firm’s financial condition. They are also less likely to understand 
relevant laws and circumstances in relevant markets in which the employer operates. Large 
organizations with significant resources exist in good part to collect, pool, and deploy 
information.120 As we shall see, one important part of our proposal for employee involvement in 
governance is to give employees access either to these same organizational resources for 
information or to the competing resources of a union.121 
A variety of cognitive biases may affect the ability of employees to bargain effectively. 
They may be short-sighted, either in that they do not understand or give too little weight to the 
long-term effect of arrangements they agree to.122 They may be overly optimistic that a variety of 
risks will not happen to them.123 They may be overly trusting when entering into an employment 
relationship.124 
Collective action problems may also block employees from effectively bargaining 
individually to protect themselves within the employment relationship. These may involve 
117 Guy Davidov, Nonwaivability in Labour Law, OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2021); Sunstein, 
supra note 10, at 210-11 (“The third approach involves nonwaivable employees’ rights. . . . This approach 
dominates the current system of statutory protections for workers in America. . .”). 
118 Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need 
of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357 (2002).   
119 Sunstein, supra note 10, at 229-31. 
120 Lit on this 
121 See infra notes 241 and accompanying text. 
122 Sunstein, supra note 10, at 242 (recent evidence suggests workers are myopic or short-sighted). 
123 Id. at 242 (“people tend to be risk optimists”). 
124 Denise Skinner, Graham Dietz, & Antoinette Weibel, The Dark Side of Trust: When Trust Becomes a 
‘Poisoned Chalice,” 21 ORGANIZATION 206 (2014). 
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collective action among employees working within the same firm, or among employees across 
firms or seeking employment. Within a firm, many elements of the workplace are local public 
goods.125 The safety of a building or assembly line, for instance, is largely the same for all 
workers involved. Many of the elements of some collective benefits are also local public goods. 
For instance, in providing health benefits an employer will negotiate an arrangement with one 
insurer or health provider—offering many different insurers or providers for each employee to 
choose among would involve much higher administrative costs. Like all public goods, there will 
be a tendency to under-provision, as each employee acts as a free rider and hopes others will 
lobby the employer to provide more (or better) of the good. 
For employees not in the same firm, collective action problems could create a race to the 
bottom. That is, given the relative bargaining position of employers and employees, if the former 
make low ball offers, the latter will feel forced to accept them—even if all employees feel they 
are unfair, if some employees do accept, others will be left out in the cold. Signaling and adverse 
selection may worsen this problem. For instance, on the subject of at-will employment, 
employees who insist on for-cause employment may risk signaling they expect that employers 
will want to fire them, while employers that offer protection against firing may attract employees 
likely to need that protection.126 
A final type of reason for strong, mandatory employment law protections is third-party 
effects. Perhaps the most important third parties are taxpayers and the government. For instance, 
if employers offer poor health care or retirement benefits, society may be caught having to 
provide for struggling employees.127 Later, once we have introduced the possibility of employee 
involvement in firm governance, we will see significant potential third party effects on others, 
such as customers and the environment.128 
E. Mandatory vs. default rules and altering rules
We have now briefly surveyed both leading benefits of and justifications for employment 
regulation129 as well as leading costs created by that regulation.130 Most legal obligations 
imposed on employers are mandatory. That is, if one meets the statutory definition of an 
employer with the requisite number of employees, and does not fall within an exception, one 
must follow the rule. There is no procedure by which a particular employer can modify the rule. 
That contrasts strongly with the area of corporate, and more generally business association, law, 
where most rules are defaults that can be modified by a particular company. There are some 
exceptions to the generally mandatory nature of employment regulation. Under the Voluntary 
Protection Program, employers with an approved safety program are subject to a looser 
125 Davidov, supra note 117, at [15-16]. 
126 Sunstein, supra note 10, at 225 (“An employer who is willing to offer job security might find that it is 
attracting marginal workers. At the same time, an employee who presses hard for job security might be 
signaling that he will deserve to be discharged.”). 
127 Davidov, supra note 117, at 17. 
128 See infra Part II.D. 
129 Part I.D 
130 Part I.C. 
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enforcement system by OSHA.131 Some states have similar programs in workplace safety 
enforcement.132 Various internal company procedures, such as training and codes of conduct, 
help protect against liability under antidiscrimination laws.133 But these are exceptions to the 
general rule of mandatory employment law. 
A variety of arguments, particularly commonplace for those versed in law and 
economics, suggest advantages from rules that are default rather than mandatory. Most broadly, 
the same fundamental value of autonomy that is used to justify workplace regulation can also be 
invoked to question mandatory legal rules. If individual employers and employees both choose 
not to be bound by a particular rule, shouldn’t we accept their choice? The other arguments 
canvassed next suggest various reasons why employees might have good reason to choose not to 
have some rules applied to them. 
Regulators, be they legislators or executive agencies, may make poor choices in imposing 
employment regulations. They may under-estimate the costs generated by a regulation, or over-
estimate the value that employees place on the protections offered by it. When a regulation is 
default, such regulatory error will be less costly as employees and employers opt out of ill-
considered rules. 
Differences among employees create another problem for mandatory rules. Rules 
typically come as one size fits all, but they may not fit all employees equally well. Limits on 
hours and overtime requirements may be valued more by middle-aged parents with children than 
by childless workers in their twenties. Healthy young employees may be willing to gamble with 
a barebones health insurance policy more than older employees with significant health risks. 
College professors may care less about having early retirement benefits than manual workers. 
And so on. With default rules, there is more room to mold the set of applicable rules to the needs 
of particular workers, or at least workforces. 
The wide range of rules applicable to the employment relationship134 deepens these 
problems with mandatory rules. Even if each individual rule is sensible for most employees, the 
full package of rules may not be. In part that is due to the multiplicative complexity of 
compliance.135 In part it is because employees, and whole workforces, may differ in the weight 
they place on the value of different rules. As the costs of complexity rise, it may make sense to 
loosen or waive some rules, but which rules are best weakened may vary among employees and 
employers. Regulators are even more likely to make mistakes in evaluating the interactive impact 
of multiple rules than they are in evaluating the impact of individual rules on their own. 
So far, we have assumed a dichotomy between mandatory and default rules. Part I.D 
gives some arguments in favor of mandatory rules, while this Part I.E identifies some drawbacks 
131 Lobel, supra note 10, at 418 (“allowing companies with exemplary safety records to take over the role 
of OSHA inspectors themselves and to be exempt from regular inspections”). 
132 Id. (describing California Cooperative Compliance Program). 
IId. at 421 (“governance strategies may operate as a defense against liability or against the grant of 
punitive damages in case of discrimination allegations by employees”). 
134 See supra Part I.A.; Hirsch, supra note 3. 
135 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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of such rules. But we often face a less stark choice than simply mandatory or default rules. For 
one thing, a rule can give employees or employers a degree of choice, while setting a mandatory 
floor (or ceiling).136 Of more interest for our purposes here, in setting default rules, regulators 
can also specify what process is required in order for an individual or organization to opt out of 
the default rule. These rules for what it takes to opt out of a default rule have been called 
“altering rules.”137  
Attention to altering rules adds new options for addressing the tradeoffs between 
mandatory versus default rules. One can set a default rule that strongly protects employees. 
Then, employers could be allowed to opt out of that rule, but the altering rule can be devised in a 
way to protect employees against abuses while still allowing them to opt out where there seems 
to be good reason to do so, and where concerns about potential abuses are reduced by the process 
required for opting out.138 Corporate law, for instance, contains a variety of default rules 
protected by somewhat “sticky” altering rules that protect shareholders. These include 
requirements for shareholder approval of certain major transactions, supermajority provisions, 
and sunset provisions.139 
For this paper, the type of altering rule that interests us concerns employee involvement 
in corporate governance. This could take the form of employee election of corporate directors, 
union representation, or works councils along the German model.140 Allowing companies that 
follow such an altering rule to opt out of some employment regulations would alleviate some of 
the problems with mandatory rules identified in this Part I.E.141 If the employee governance 
mechanism is properly structured with necessary safeguards, then when employees collectively 
have decided to modify some legal rules, we would be relatively confident that the governance 
process has addressed the informational, cognitive, incentive, and collective action problems 
identified above142 that are used to justify making rules mandatory. Of course, the devil is in the 
details—what structural safeguards are needed to give assurance that decisions to opt out 
genuinely reflect the considered best interests of the affected employees? We shall have to 
address that question below. 
II. Employers as Firms
In Part I we explored the many legal responsibilities that are tied to the employment
relationship. These all attempt to protect employees. We argued that there should be considerable 
leeway to vary the rules in firms with adequately empowered employees, an argument we shall 
elaborate in later Parts. But advocating for employee involvement implicates the interests of 
136 Sunstein, supra note 10, at 245. 
137 Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 131 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012); 
Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383 (2007). 
138 McDonnell, supra note 137, at 397-98 (applying this approach to the protection of shareholders in 
corporate law). 
139 Id. at 402-13 (discussing these). 
140 We discuss the choice among these various forms of employee governance below, see infra Part III. 
141 Sunstein, supra note 10, at 264-66, suggests that some variation from statutory rules could be allowed 
when approved by a union representing employees. 
142 Part I.D. 
                                                       
21 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Would it be good for them? Does involving employees in 
firm governance constitute good corporate governance, not simply good protection of 
employees? Yes. Employees and shareholders are the key inside participants in firm production, 
and involving them in governance will increase value created for all firm stakeholders. In 
defending this claim, we first critically review the leading arguments usually made to defend the 
prevailing American focus on the interests of shareholders in governing corporations.143 We then 
show how core concepts from the economic theory of the firm support involving employees in 
governance, situating them as core insiders along with shareholders.144 Finally, we suggest 
reasons why employees will tend to support decisions that favor the interests of other 
stakeholders, such as customers, local communities, and the environment, as well.145 
A. Shareholder Primacy
The leading economic theories of the firm are far from intrinsically hostile to governance 
arrangements that empower employees.146 However, as the economic theory of the firm was 
incorporated into legal scholarship, it was closely associated with perspectives that focused on 
promoting shareholder wealth maximization and empowering only shareholders (at most) above 
all other stakeholder groups. These perspectives both reflect basic structural realities of 
governance in corporate law and also helped shape understanding of that law. 
The core structural fact of corporate law is that the board of directors controls most 
decisions, and only shareholders elect directors. Also, only shareholders vote alongside the board 
on certain fundamental transactions.147 Scholars seeking to justify corporate law must explain 
this special role for shareholders. As theory progressed with that explanation at the same time as 
the growth of shareholders engaged in hostile takeovers, the focus on shareholders helped shape 
an understanding that the fiduciary duty of directors requires an exclusive ultimate focus on the 
interest of shareholders.148  
The leading scholarly argument favoring an exclusive focus on shareholder wealth 
maximization as the objective of corporate decisonmaking has been that shareholders are the 
residual claimants. Common shareholders are not promised any set financial return. Rather, they 
have the ultimate right to profits earned after all other claimants with fixed contractual rights 
have been paid.149 Residual claimants have a special role because it harder to write a contract 
143 Part II.A. 
144 Part II.B. 
145 Part II.C. 
146 See Part II.B. 
147 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 27 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 153 (2012) (“The whole design of corporate law in the United States is built 
around the relationship between corporate managers and stockholders, not relationships with other 
constituencies. In the corporate republic, only stockholders get to vote and only stockholders get to sue to 
enforce directors' fiduciary duties.”) 
148 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
149 FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36-39 
(1991); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders 
the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 
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protecting their interests. All decisions affecting a corporation affect the return of the residual 
claimants, and no explicit contract can instruct managers how to make all decisions.150 
Moreover, choices that maximize firm profits  will maximize total social surplus, assuming that 
all social costs and benefits are adequately priced in the goods and serviced consumed and sold 
by firms.151 
There are a variety of problems with these arguments for the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm. Employees are often significant residual claimants too, as the income and 
future prospects of employees depend upon their employer’s profitability.152 Shareholders do not 
have incentive to maximize the financial surplus a firm generates, because limited liability makes 
them prefer overly-risky actions.153 Shareholders will not generally agree on maximizing 
shareholder value as the sole valuable goal.154 Finally, the assumption that input and output 
prices internalize all relevant social costs and benefits is heroic.155 
Another leading argument for shareholder wealth maximization is that shareholders have 
more homogenous interests than other stakeholders, and hence will conflict less in making 
decisions.156 However, more recent scholarship has emphasized that shareholders are quite 
varied, with differences in time horizon, risk preferences, voting rights, and non-financial 
preferences.157 Even where shareholders agree on wealth maximization as a goal, they may 
disagree on how to achieve that goal.158 Thus, conflict is a serious problem among shareholders 
as well as other stakeholders, including employees. 
Many scholars who believe that maximizing shareholder wealth is the proper end of 
corporate law advocate relatively strong shareholder power to ensure managerial 
550 (2003). Much of this theory is rooted in a nexus of contracts approach drawn from Michael C. Jensen 
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).  Jensen and Meckling focus on how the financial structure of a 
firm, in particular the choice between debt and equity, affects agency costs. Note that this theory focuses 
on providers of money, i.e. shareholders, and has little to say about the employment relationship for non-
managers. 
150 Id. 
151 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 389-90 (1986); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 149, at 
36. 
152 See infra notes 173 through 174 and accompanying text. 
153 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 149, at 334. 
154 Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy to 
Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. Rev. 2419, 2433-34 (2020); Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies 
Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017); Imam 
Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 574-92 (2006). 
155 See infra Part II.C. 
156 The leading proponent of this argument is Henry Hansmann. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE 
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work ESOPs, Law 
Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 90 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990); Henry Hansmann, 
Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 489 (1993). 
157 See supra note 154. 
158 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 771 (2017) (explaining the role of principal costs in corporations). 
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accountability.159 However, some who accept that end nonetheless believe that shareholders 
should have quite limited power, leaving boards and managers wide discretion to decide how 
best to maximize shareholder wealth. Steve Bainbridge’s board primacy theory argues this 
position (which aligns well with Delaware corporate law),160 drawing strongly on the tradeoff 
between authority and responsibility emphasized by Ken Arrow’s theory of corporate 
governance.161 However, Bainbridge does not explain why that tradeoff should always be 
decided in favor of authority.162 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout offer a different defense of board primacy, one that serves 
as a transition to alternative approaches to corporate governance.163 Drawing on Ragan and 
Zingales’s theory of access to resources,164 they conceive of the board as a mediating hierarch 
which regulates resource access for competing groups of corporate insiders, with none of them 
given much power so that the hierarch can deal fairly with all.165 They thus do not see the 
interests of shareholders as being privileged, and in other work Blair argues for a role for 
employees in corporate governance.166 However, in their joint work Blair and Stout accept the 
existing corporate law framework in which only shareholders are empowered to elect the board, 
even though that framework does not seem to follow from their theory.167 
. 
B. Employees and Firm Governance
We reject the above arguments for privileging shareholders. Our approach would 
transform both the allocation of power and the understanding of the appropriate objective 
function for businesses. In allocating power, we suggest a role for employees, either in choosing 
the board of directors (or comparable leading decisionmaker), choosing representatives to a body 
that makes major employment-related decisions, or choosing a union to bargain for employee 
interests.168 In understanding the objective function of businesses, we would conceive of it as 
balancing the interests of shareholders and employees.169 Employees are at the heart of the core 
productive activities that define a firm. That makes employees vulnerable to opportunisitic 
decisions that hurt them, gives them access to crucial information that can benefit the business, 
and makes motivating effective employee behavior critical to firm success. 
159 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 
(2005). 
160 Bainbridge, supra note 149. 
161 See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974). 
162 Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of the New Corporate 
Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139 (2009). 
163 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 
247 (1999). 
164 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 390 
(1998). 
165 Blair & Stout, supra note 163. 
166 MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (19950. 
167 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 154, at 2436. 
168 We discuss the choice among these forms of employee governance in Part III. 
169 And perhaps the interests of other stakeholders as well. 
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One argument for empowering employees flows from the economic theory of the firm.170 
If a party to a relationship invests heavily in property that is much more valuable within the 
relationship, that person may then find it hard to exit the relationship, and may thus lose 
bargaining power. Relationships should be structured to limit this hold-up problem.171 Giving a 
vulnerable party power over decisions is a one such way of structuring relationships. 
Shareholders of a corporation are one vulnerable group, insofar as they finance the purchase and 
development of firm-specific physical and reputational capital. Indeed, this is another standard 
argument in favor of shareholder primacy.172  
But many employees invest heavily in firm-specific human capital, economist jargon for 
knowledge and skill that is valuable only while working within a given business. Think, for 
instance, of knowledge about who within an organization can best help solve problems of 
different types, or knowledge of vocabulary and operating procedures unique to a business. This 
specialized knowledge makes employees residual claimants as well. As her firm-specific human 
capital grows, an employee becomes increasingly tied to the firm, since she is more valuable 
working there than anywhere else. Although she may receive wages set at a specific amount by 
contract, her job security with associated future advancement, wage increases, and pensions 
depends on the prosperity of her employer.173 Moreover, the stake of employees in a firm is 
inherently undiversified—most persons have only one job at a time. Shareholders in public 
companies, at least, can easily diversify their investments.174 Thus, the standard economic theory 
of the firm suggests that employees are due at least as much protection and control as 
shareholders. 
Empowering workers can also improve the functioning of firms in several crucial ways 
tied to information that employees learn through their work. First, employees learn much about a 
business’s affairs as a byproduct of their work.175 This information can generate useful ideas for 
how to produce more efficiently, ways to improve customer satisfaction, and potential new 
investment opportunities. Knowledge-based theories of the firm point to this as an important 
170 This begins with Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
171 This argument is developed in the transaction cost theory of the firm derived from the work of Oliver 
Williamson. See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985). It is further developed in the closely related property 
rights theory of the firm of Hart, Grossman, and Moore. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995). 
172 Id. 
173 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 305-06 (1998); 
Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-
Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 907-08 (1993); Katherine V. W. Stone, Employees 
as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 49-53 
(1991). 
174 Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. 
J. L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 351 (2008).
175 Id. at 355-56; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 154, at 2458-62; Blair, supra note 166; Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, 17 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 133 (1985); Alan
Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 160 (1991);
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factor in productivity, and the growing importance of knowledge in many firms176 may argue for 
a better integration of employees within firm governance.  
Employee information is also useful for holding managers accountable—employees will 
often know when those in charge are misbehaving. Particularly in public companies, employees 
are likely to be far better informed than shareholders. Thus, employee governance may improve 
the authority/responsibility tradeoff that Arrow emphasizes, assuming one treats this as a genuine 
tradeoff rather than as an argument for always favoring authority a la Bainbridge.177 Note that 
both of these uses of information improve firm functioning generally, making a larger surplus 
available to distribute for employees, shareholders, and other participants.  
There is a surface tension between this informational argument favoring employee 
governance and the informational argument favoring mandatory employment regulation, namely 
that employees need protection due to an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis employers.178 The 
two points do not conflict. There are various types of information that are relevant to employee 
welfare and firm governance. Employees have natural access to some types of information, 
particularly concerning working conditions, and some aspects of relations with customers as 
well. Most employees lack access to other important sorts of information, including the 
company’s financial position and complicated legal regulations. 
Involving employees in governance decisions may also improve their job satisfaction and 
motivation.179 Research on procedural justice suggests that if people believe decisions are made 
in a fair way, they will be more likely to abide by the decisions and to promote the goals of the 
business.180 This will reduce the bonding and monitoring costs required to get employees to do 
their jobs well.181 This is another way that employee governance may increase the total firm 
surplus available to distribute among all stakeholders, including shareholders. 
176 Kathleen R. Conner & C.K. Prahalad, A Resource-based Theory of the Firm: Knowledge Versus 
Opportunism, 7 ORG. SCIENCE 477, 485 (1996); Robert M. Grant, Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of 
the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT J. 109 (1996); Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, A Knowledge-
Based Theory of the Firm—The Problem-Solving Perspective, ORG. SCIENCE (2004); Richard N. Langlois 
& Nicolai J. Foss, Capabilities and Governance: The Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic 
Organization, 52 KYKLOS 201 (1999); Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J. ECON. 
LIT. 1382 (1992)r; Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions, and Firm 
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123 (2007). 
177 McDonnell, supra note 162. 
178 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
179 Tom Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings, 70 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1287 (2005); Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, Do Workers Enjoy Procedural Utility?, 49 APP.
ECON. Q. 149 (2003).
180 TOM R. TYLER & STEVE L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL
IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 54-55 (2000).
181 Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Democratic Firm: An Agency-Theoretic Evaluation, in
MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY 13 (Samuel Bowles et
al. eds. 1993).
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Despite these arguments for empowering employees, there are significant concerns. The 
argument about the relative homogeneity of shareholders reducing politicization182 leads to a 
mirror-image critique of employee governance as increasing decision costs.183 The problem is 
worse if one combines both shareholders and employees in governance, as the two groups may 
conflict frequently. This has been a common criticism of codetermination in Germany.184 This is 
a real concern, but it is often over-blown. We have already seen that shareholders are quite 
heterogeneous themselves,185 reducing their advantage over employees. Furthermore, there are a 
variety of ways to reduce the costs of employee governance. Employees and managers could 
learn how to manage the decision process more effectively. They could learn in many ways: in 
school186 (including business school), through experience in more participatory organizations, or 
with the help of supporting persons and organizations such as lawyers, consultants, and banks. 
This suggests significant network effects and path dependence: the more widespread employee 
governance is, the more likely it would be to find such institutional support, and vice versa.187 
C. Employees and Other Stakeholders
Company decisions affect other stakeholders too. These include creditors, customers, 
suppliers, local communities, and the environment. Increasing attention is being paid to 
stakeholder interests.188  
Much corporate law activism and scholarship criticizing the shareholder primacy 
approach has focused on the interests of multiple stakeholder groups.189 We agree with the move 
away from shareholder wealth maximization, but we also think that in general employees and 
shareholders have a more central place within the firm than other stakeholders.190 The above 
arguments for employee involvement in governance do not apply to other stakeholders in most 
circumstances. Other stakeholders do not usually make significant firm-specific investments in 
physical or human capital, and hence are more able to exit and do business with other firms. 
Other stakeholders also typically do not acquire as much valuable information about firms in 
182 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
183 Id. 
184 For good discussions of codetermination, see THEODOR BAUMS & PETER ULMER, EDS. EMPLOYEES’ 
CO-DETERMINATION IN THE MEMBERS STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2004); Katherine Pistor, 
Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds. (1999); Stefan Prigge, A Survey 
of German Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE 
ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 943 (K.J. Hopt et al. eds. 1998). 
185 See supra note 157 through 158 and accompanying text. 
186 SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA (1976). 
187 McDonnell, supra  note 174, at 376. 
188 The literature is voluminous. For recent thoughts on related developments, see Hayden & Bodie, supra 
note 154; Brett H. McDonnell et al., Green Boardrooms?, CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Brett H. 
McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 
77 (2018). 
189 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT (2001); Blair 
& Stout, supra note 163; David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1013 
(2013). 
190 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 154; McDonnell, supra note 174. 
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their relationships with them. Since other stakeholders are typically not acting on behalf of a firm 
in their relationship, they do not need to be motivated to act loyally. In most circumstances, 
persons other than managers, shareholders, and employees are not directly involved in joint 
production activities. The other stakeholder groups are not insiders as employees are.191 There 
are circumstances where a stakeholder group should be given a central voice in firm governance. 
Consumer and supplier cooperatives have a long history.192 But they are exceptions, albeit 
notable ones. 
Though in most cases it does not make sense to give stakeholders other than employees 
and shareholders formal voting power, it is good if those who do have power are inclined to take 
the interests of others into account. The standard argument for shareholder primacy denies this. 
So long as market prices for inputs and outputs reflect social costs and benefits, maximizing firm 
profits will maximize net social value. Markets will do much to reflect social costs, particularly 
when one considers reputational effects. Where prices and reputation fail to internalize all 
important social effects, the standard argument is that other forms of legal regulation outside 
corporate law should limit harmful behavior.193  
However, while market, reputational, and regulatory protections go a long way in 
reducing externalities, they all have serious shortcomings. Hence we want business managers to 
take into account the interests of various stakeholders, above and beyond their impact on long-
term profits. Another argument for involving employees in governance is that they are often 
more likely than shareholders to have interests aligned with those of other stakeholders who we 
want to protect. It is a common argument that the shareholder wealth maximization norm has 
caused managers to focus on short-term profits in ways that harm many other interests.194 Might 
employee representatives behave differently?  
They might. Insofar as public bads generated by businesses have mainly local effects, 
employees, who live where the business is located, may care more about those effects than more 
dispersed shareholders.195 For shareholders with a significant financial stake in a business, that 
large stake may cause them to focus more on profits than is the case for employees.196 There is 
some evidence that smaller firms and firms located in communities with higher social capital 
pollute less.197 Also, insofar as the traditional understanding of shareholding focuses on financial 
returns, the focus on money may make it less likely that shareholders will follow other-regarding 
191 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 154, at 2441-42. 
192 CHARLES T. AUTRY & ROLAND F. HALL, THE LAW OF COOPERATIVES 9 (2009). 
193 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N. Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE (Sept. 13, 1970). 
194 MITCHELL, supra note 189; LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012). 
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196 John E. Roemer, Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?, 95 
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 227 (1993). A counter-argument, though, is that diversified shareholders in 
public companies may actually care quite a bit about externalities. Madison Condon, Externalities and the 
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norms than employees. That is not to say that employee governance will always be a boon to 
other stakeholders—sometimes it will not. But overall we suspect that employee involvement in 
governance will be good for other stakeholders. 
III. Systems of Employee Governance
Employee participation in firm governance is not a new idea.  There are a variety of 
possible ways through which workers may have voice and power within the overall governance 
structure. In this part, we consider three main types of employee governance: union 
representation, shop floor governance, and board representation. Union representation involves 
employees selecting a labor organization to represent them in bargaining over wages and the 
conditions of employment. There are many variations, including which employees in a firm are 
unionized, how many different unions represent employees in the firm, and what they are 
empowered to bargain about. Shop floor governance, such as works councils or the holacracy 
model, involves employees either directly or through elected representatives in decisions 
concerning local operations and decisions. Board representation involves having employees elect 
representatives to the board of directors. This can vary in several dimensions, including what 
fraction of directors employees select and whether all employees vote together or separate 
categories vote separately. Together, these three systems offer potential mechanisms through 
which employees can participate in governance.  Below, we briefly survey these possibilities and 
evaluate their use in constructing a more robust method of worker governance. 
A. Union Representation
Our current labor unions have their genesis in both artisanal craft guilds and the social 
movements of the early industrial era.  Craft guilds date from the middle ages when groups of 
learned tradesmen created associations to preserve their traditions and protect their business 
interests.198  In the United States, journeymen workers formed craft unions beginning in the early 
19th Century.199  These craft unions flourished as institutions for lower-level workers within the 
skilled trades, with sixty-two such unions having been formed by the end of the 1800s.200  
Concurrently with these trade-oriented organizations were the development of social movements 
for the industrial workers who began filling factories during the Industrial Age.  Here the unions 
focused on plight of unskilled workers and relied on mass organizing, strikes, and protest.  The 
line between these approaches was not necessarily well-defined, but roughly the divide was 
between skilled artisanal workers protecting their trade and industrial workers fighting for 
survival wages and basic rights.201 
198 KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 19 (2004). 
199 Id. at 18. 
200 Id.  
201 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, LABOR LAW 36-37 (2d ed. 2020) (describing the 
differences between the craft-based approach of the American Federation of Labor and the industrial-
oriented approach of the Congress of Industrial Organizations). 
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Labor relations were largely unregulated in these early days, although courts did at times 
unions or pursue criminal judgments when workers worked together to push for better terms and 
conditions.202  Although a consensus emerged over time allowing unions to organize and go out 
on strike, courts still were quick to enjoin picketing and boycotts as restraints of trade under 
common law.203  Labor law was federalized in 1935 through the Wagner Act, which provided for 
a right to join unions, a mechanism for selecting union representation through voting, and the 
regulation of employer unfair labor practices such as discrimination against union activity. This 
model has been modified over time to regulate secondary picketing and require democratic 
governance within labor organizations but has kept the basic structure of exclusive 
representation, collective bargaining, and protection of employee rights.  Even public-sector 
unions, which are governed by state law, follow these basic building blocks. 
The raison d’etre of private-sector labor law is collective bargaining.  If selected by a 
majority of employees in a bargaining unit, a union is empowered to bargain in good faith with 
the employer on the workers’ behalf.  The employer must bargain with the union or else it 
commits an unfair labor practice.204   The rest of labor law facilitates this bargaining relationship: 
employers are not permitted to fire or punish workers for their support of the union; the National 
Labor Relations Board conducts elections to determine if employees want a union to represent 
them; and unions cannot conduct signal picketing at secondary employers—employers with 
whom they do not have a bargaining relationship. 
Our system of collective bargaining has been justified as a form of “industrial 
democracy” or “workplace democracy” because of its use of elections to empower workers.205  
Undoubtedly, unions have negotiated better terms and conditions of employment for represented 
employees: higher wages, just-cause termination protections, grievance-arbitration processes, 
and stronger benefits.206  Unions can also work with employers to tailor collective bargaining 
agreements toward the particular experiences of the workers involved.  As a “democracy,” 
workers vote for their collective representatives and also generally vote to approve the collective 
bargaining agreements that they negotiate.207  Labor organizations can also consolidate power as 
collective representatives and may call out the workers on strike to reinforce their negotiation 
202 Id. at 22 (discussing the 1806 Philadelphia Cordwainers case). 
203 Id.at 22-23; see also Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896). 
204 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (setting forth the duty to bargain); id. § 159 (establishing the process to select 
the employees’ collective representative). 
205 See Becker, supra note 9, at 496 (discussing how NLRA supporters touted the virtues of industrial 
democracy as a form of democratic governance). 
206 JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 1-2 (2014).  See also RICHARD B. FREEMAN & 
JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 43–60 (1984) (discussing studies of the union wage effect); 
David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would 
Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 383, 391 (2004) (finding a 17.0% private-sector 
union wage effect and a 14.5% public-sector union wage effect in the late 1990s). 
207 Unions are not required to put their contracts to a vote, but most do as a matter of practice. Alan Hyde, 
Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984) (noting that unions need not offer 
employees a vote on contract ratification). 
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positions.208  This mix of democracy and power is why many reformers and academics still see 
labor unions as the best mechanism for worker empowerment and just workplaces. 
Unfortunately, only a small percentage of workers now have collective representation.   
The percentage of unionized private-sector employees has been steadily shrinking since its 1950s 
heyday, from a high of about 35% to the current 6.6%.209  Moreover, from a governance 
perspective, there is a larger structural problem with labor law: it is not true governance power.  
Employers need only bargain in good place—there is no requirement that the employer make any 
concessions to union demands.210  Federal labor law also leaves much of the core operations of 
the employer’s business off the table. Employers are only required to bargain on topics that are 
categorized as “mandatory” subjects of bargaining.211  The mandatory label applies to the terms 
and conditions of employment; the employer has no duty to negotiate over issues such as product 
development, executive compensation, financial structuring, and even internal firm 
governance.212  The “core of entrepreneurial control”213 is reserved to the employer itself as a 
matter of governance that lies outside the bargaining process.  By centering collective bargaining 
only on the employment relationship, federal labor law has fenced workers and their 
representatives out of any real participation in the firm’s management.214 
At one point in our history, we expected collective bargaining to create a system of 
industrial democracy in which employees would participate in the governance of their 
workplaces.  The project succeeded in substantial ways, but unions now only represent a small 
fraction of private sector workers.  And as a system of democratic governance, collective 
bargaining is flawed: it maintains the internal firm governance of the employer and only requires 
the employer to bargain over terms and conditions of employment.  True worker governance 
requires a different approach. 
B. Shop-floor Participatory Governance
208 See Nicholas Kristof, The Cost of a Decline in Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/opinion/nicholas-kristof-the-cost-of-a-decline-in-unions.html 
(describing how unions have been integral to maintaining the middle class and suggesting that the decline 
in unions has led to income inequality). 
209 Union Membership (Annual) News Release, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 23, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.htm. See also TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: 
AMERICA’S GROWING INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 128 (2012) (discussing the 
decline in union membership). 
210 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
211 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (setting out the mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining). 
212 See id. (emphasizing a party’s freedom to bargain or not bargain over other subjects). 
213 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (further 
establishing that managerial decisions lie outside the scope of mandatory subjects). See also James Gray 
Pope, Class Conflicts of Law II: Solidarity, Entrepreneurship, and the Deep Agenda of the Obama NLRB, 
57 BUFF. L. REV. 653, 658 (2009) (“The doctrine [of entrepreneurial control] provides the focal point for 
a coherent and positive conception of employer interests that has come to permeate the labor law.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
214 See Edward Silver & Joan McAvoy, The National Labor Relations Act at the Crossroads, 56 
FORDHAM L. REV. 181, 187 (1987) (explaining criticisms of the NLRA and the NLRB). 
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The modern corporation is generally managed from within through a hierarchical 
approach.   The board of directors has control over the company but delegates governance 
responsibilities to a set of officers, who then control the actual workings of the corporation.215  
The chief executive officer has ultimate managerial power, with other officers below, and then 
executives, managers, and the mass of employees.  This structure informs our legal and societal 
perspective on the nature of the organization itself. We assume that corporations must be 
governed from within through hierarchy, and that the work of employees is controlled by the 
employer, acting through managers and supervisors.  
However, hierarchy is not endemic to the corporate structure.  Participatory management 
is a common term for those managerial methodologies that endeavor to flatten or shift the power 
relations within the traditional corporate chain of command.  Systems of participatory 
management have a long if limited history, both in the United States and abroad. The last 
significant bloom of participatory management within firms occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, as 
U.S. firms looked to Japan and Germany for guidance.216  Ideas such as quality circles and total 
quality management moved away from rote assembly lined to a system of worker responsibility 
for the ultimate product.217   
As concerns about the social purpose of corporations has grown, companies are 
rediscovering participatory management models.218  These approaches do not fall within the 
established alternatives such as employee-owned companies, consumer cooperatives, or non-
profits.  Instead, they are for-profit companies, organized as corporations, partnerships, or LLCs, 
that have radically restructured the internal hierarchy.  These efforts have been accorded various 
labels, such as “self-managed,” “self-actualizing,” “evolutionary,” “integral,” “flat,” and even 
215 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2011) (“Every corporation organized under this chapter 
shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the 
board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws ....”). 
216 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 
657, 673 (1996) (“Over the last two decades, however, participatory management has emerged as the 
principal putative challenger to traditional corporate hierarchies.”).  However, efforts to integrate 
employees into the governance of the firm are long-standing.  See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Codetermination 
in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 COMP. L. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 170 
(1982). 
217 See Jon Gertner, From 0 to 60 to World Domination, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Feb. 17, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/magazine/18Toyota.t.html. Toyota is known for the rule that 
anyone on the assembly line can shut down production if they see a problem. 
218 For examples of this broader literature, see COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE 
CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013); RAJ SISODIA, JAG SHETH & 
DAVID WOLFE, FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: HOW WORLD-CLASS COMPANIES PROFIT FROM PASSION AND 
PURPOSE (2014). 
                                                       
32 
“teal.”219  They seek to bring more worker participation within the traditional outer shell of 
business organizations.220   
Systems of participatory management have been the subject of much discussion in the 
business management literature but have been less examined in the legal literature.221  There is 
less to talk about, as these systems generally sit within the standard corporate governance 
framework and exist in union-free workplaces.  As creatures of management policy, these 
systems can be installed, changed, and removed without any employee consent or input.222  At 
most, employees might have contractual claims to certain procedures, but courts have generally 
looked less kindly on those as management lawyers know how to insert the right disclaimers.223  
So participatory management exists outside the zone of relevance for the law – it is a managerial 
strategy. 
The law could be reoriented to incentivize or require companies to adopt certain aspects 
of participatory management.  Unions existed prior to federal labor law, but the NLRA created a 
legal system of rights and responsibilities that facilitated their role within the economy.  But the 
current lack of legal intersection points up one of the weaknesses of participatory management: it 
is a function of managerial decisionmaking, and it exists at the pleasure of management. As 
currently utilized in the U.S. economy, they are designed to bolster quality and productivity 
within the workforce by empowering workers within their jobs.  It is the rare participatory-
management system that seeks to empower workers by constraining management.224  But 
binding systems of employee participation have generally come through unions or, as discussed 
next, through corporate governance. 
219 See FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING ORGANIZATIONS 
INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 43 (2014) (using “self-actualizing,” 
“evolutionary,” “integral,” and “teal”); Ethan Bernstein et al., Beyond the Holacracy Hype, HARV. BUS. 
REV. 38, 40 (July–Aug. 2016) (using “self-managed” and “flat”).   
220 One particular instantiation of this broader movement is a system known as “holacracy.” See, e.g., 
BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING 
WORLD (2015); Bernstein et al., supra note 219. For an exploration of the legal ramifications of 
holacracy, see Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619 (2018) 
221 For notable exceptions, see HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON EMPLOYEE VOICE (Adrian Wilkinson et al. 
eds., 2014); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational 
Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 986-90 (1998) (providing a taxonomy); Marleen A. 
O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management 
Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 901 (1993). 
222 The default rule for holacracy is to leave this structure in place.  ROBERTSON, supra note 220, at 151 
(suggesting that beginning holacracy adopters use a CEO policy, rather than board-level action, “to avoid 
the extra complexity of getting board-level buy-in up front”). 
223 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 (2015) (noting that “the presence of a prominent 
disclaimer in the text of the statement may indicate that it is a hortatory pronouncement rather than a 
statement intended to govern the employer's operational personnel decisions”). 
224 This is arguably what holacracy is designed to do.  As Robertson describes it in his book, the firm’s 
constitution under holacracy is the “core rulebook for the organization” whose “rules and processes reign 
supreme, and trump even the person who adopted it.”  ROBERTSON, supra note 220, at 21. 
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C. Board Representation and Employee Ownership
The most direct method of employee participation in governance is through various 
mechanisms of employee ownership.  Employee-owned firms have taken on different forms: 
worker cooperatives, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), equity compensation plans, and 
managerial leveraged buyouts.  By aligning workers’ incentives with the overall value of the 
firm, employee ownership not only motivates workers to maximize utility—it also gives workers 
the true benefits of their labor.  The idea of employee ownership rights has resonated within the 
American ethos throughout our history and unites those who favor a hardscrabble capitalism 
with those who believe in a society of civic engagement.225 
Despite efforts to facilitate employee ownership, it remains largely marginal within our 
economic system.  The ESOP, introduced with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974, has had sustained if limited success.226  An estimated ten percent of employees 
participated in ESOPs as of 1990;227 in 2020, around 10 million workers are active 
participants.228  However, while ESOPs facilitate employee participation in ownership, they do 
not offer much employee participation in governance.  Employees participate in the ESOP as 
beneficiaries of a plan, and the plan’s trustee manages the shares on their behalf.229  The law 
does not require that employees vote for directors or otherwise have rights beyond financial 
interests.230  Thus, ESOPs are similar to other compensation mechanisms such as stock options 
and bonus plans—they provide financial participation in the share price but do not require 
employee governance representation. 
Other organizational structures offer more direct participation, most notably the 
cooperative.  Structured differently than corporations, cooperatives generally provide for one 
“share” for each participant and require participation in governance from all members.231  
225 See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 
13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 336 (2008) (making the case for employee participation through law and 
economics as well as civic republicanism). 
226 Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in 
the Design of A Comprehensive and Contemporary American "Ownership Society", 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 
45, 139 (2005). 
227 HANSMANN, supra note 156, at 105. 
228 National Center for Employee Ownership, Employee Ownership by the Numbers, 
https://www.nceo.org/articles/employee-ownership-by-the-numbers#2 (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). 
229 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and Implementation of 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other "Survivalists", 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 960 (1998) (“The structure of ESOPs can vary significantly, but at their core they 
are equity plans that hold shares of a company in a trust for their participants.”). 
230 As Jeff Hirsch explained, “Because voting rights can be assigned to a trustee, an individual employee-
owner may only possess financial distribution rights in her company, without obtaining any voting rights. 
Once the shares are distributed (as the loan is paid off), the employee-owner is able to vote those shares; it 
takes many years, however, for such a distribution to occur. Thus, employee-owners are left facing the 
risks associated with equity without any voting rights in their stock.” Id. at 962-63. 
231 See HANSMANN, supra note 156); Ariana R. Levinson, Founding Worker Cooperatives: Social 
Movement Theory and the Law, 14 NEV. L.J. 322, 325-26 (2014). 
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Consumer cooperatives have been prevalent in some industries, such as utilities and insurance.232  
Worker cooperatives, however, have not been common.233  A relative of the worker cooperative 
is the partnership controlled by a set of workers.  Law firms were mandated to take the form of 
common partnerships owned by a set of attorneys who worked for them.234  Today, however, 
most states permit law firms (and other associations of professionals) to form as limited liability 
partnerships and have management structures closer to corporate ones.  Corporate ownership of 
law firms is still not permitted. 
These models of worker governance are tied to ownership, in that workers have both 
financial rights to profits or distributions as well as governance rights.  But other models provide 
for governance without financial stakes.  The system of codetermination provides for employee 
representatives on the board of directors simply through their role as employees.  Employee 
board representation has a very limited history in the United States, but it is governing law in 
many European states, most notably Germany.  Under German law, employees select fifty 
percent of the directors on the supervisory board, which has similar responsibilities to the U.S. 
corporate board.235  Although shareholders select the chair, who acts as the tiebreaker, employees 
have significant power within the corporation and have operating control in many companies.236  
In the last two years, bills proposed by Senators Baldwin and Warren have each proposed 
systems of codetermination requiring U.S. companies to have a percentage of their workers on 
corporate boards.237 
D. Assessing Systems of Employee Governance Participation
We have seen two different kinds of arguments in favor of involving employees in firm 
governance. First, it could lead to better protection of employees. Rather than relying on 
mandatory employment regulations that could go wrong for a variety of reasons, setting default 
rules that protect employees while allowing those employees through a collective process to 
modify the rules can lead to better protection at a lower cost.238 Second, employee governance 
may generate a higher surplus that benefits all participants in a business enterprise, not just 
employees but also shareholders, creditors, customers, and the community at large. If 
232 HANSMANN, supra note 156. 
233 Levinson, supra note 231, at 323 (“Yet despite the promise they hold, worker cooperatives are 
relatively rare in the United States.”). 
234 HANSMANN, supra note 156. 
235 Pistor, supra note 184; Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Codetermination in Theory and 
Practice, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).  Under codetermination there is also a managerial board 
which acts more akin to the set of officers and executives under U.S. law.   
236 Volkswagen is a special example, since by law the state government of Lower Saxony has an 
ownership stake and generally supports workers in its voting.  See Nicola F. Sharpe, Volkwagen’s Bad 
Decisions & Harmful Emissions: How Poor Process Corrupted Codetermination in Germany’s Dual 
Board Structure, 7 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 49, 72-76 (2017). 
237 Senator Tammy Baldwin has proposed the Reward Work Act, which proposes that one-third of 
directors of public companies be selected directly by employees.  Reward Work Act, S. 915, 116th Cong. 
§ 3(b) (2019).  The Accountable Capitalism Act, proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren, would require
that companies with more than $1 billion in average revenue have employees select at least 40% of the
seats on the board.  Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6(b)(1) (2018).
238 See supra Part I.E.
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employment regulation encourages employee involvement in governance, it can thus improve the 
lot of all corporate constituencies.239  
How do these three types of employee governance compare in their ability to address the 
various major arguments that favor mandatory employment regulation?240 That is, what types of 
employee governance will best respond to the problems that employment regulation attempts to 
correct, so that we will feel comfortable allowing the relaxation of regulation where such 
governance is present? One argument favoring regulation is that individual workers will have 
trouble accessing and processing some important types of information more readily available to 
employers, including the financial condition of the business and the regulatory environment. 
Board representation is the type of employee governance most likely to reduce this disparity with 
respect to company-specific financial (and other) information, as it gives employee directors 
access to all of the information about the company available to the board, which is essentially all 
the relevant internal information (although directors are less able than officers to fully digest this 
information,241 so even board representation won’t fully equalize the disparity between workers 
and officers). For information on the legal and market environment, both board and union 
representation would seem to have some advantages. Employee directors again have access to 
the same information available to the rest of the board, but unions may have alternative sources 
of information on labor and employment laws, and on market conditions in other unionized 
companies, that might be particularly useful from a worker perspective.  
Another set of arguments favoring mandatory employment regulation concerns collective 
action problems. As we saw, these can be internal within a company or external for workers 
across different companies.242 For the internal collective actions, both board representation and 
shop floor governance are potentially effective, with the latter particularly focused on many of 
the key local public goods, such as workplace safety. For the external collective actions, union 
representation would seem the better solution. 
The final set of arguments we saw favoring mandatory employment regulation looked at 
a variety of cognitive biases that may prevent individual workers from adequately bargaining to 
protect their interests.243 Moving from individual to collective bargaining may address at least 
some of these biases. In part that may happen through a collective deliberation process, although 
collective processes can produce their own biases (e.g., elected representatives may have a time 
horizon limited by the length of their term in office). It is not clear which if any of the three 
forms of employee governance has an advantage on this dimension. 
How do the three types of employee governance compare in their ability to achieve the 
potential gains in generating surplus for all corporate constituencies, while avoiding potential 
239 See supra Part II.B. 
240 See supra Part I.D. 
241 Lisa M. Fairfax, The Elusive Question for Director Independence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 170, 180 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) 
(“Informational asymmetries inherent in the role of independent directors further limit such directors’ 
ability to be effective monitors”). 
242 See supra notes 126 through 127 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra notes 122 through 124 and accompanying text. 
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costs that could reduce or eliminate those gains?244 Board representation would give employees 
voice over the widest range of decisions affecting them, and bring their information and 
perspective to bear on those decisions. But board representation also may be subject to more 
conflict and decision costs and do more to scare off investors, at least as compared with shop 
floor governance and perhaps as compared with unionization too. Much of the informational 
benefit that comes from employee involvement will involve the kind of in-company, shop-floor 
issues captured through shop floor governance. It is not clear which form of governance is likely 
to have stronger motivational effects. 
What about the effect of employee governance on decisions affecting stakeholders other 
than employees and shareholders?245 For these effects, board representation seems the most 
significant, as it gives employees a voice in all major decisions affecting a company. Both union 
representation and shop floor governance are focused on terms and conditions of employment 
that are likely to be of most interest to employees themselves and to shareholders through the 
effect on profits, with other stakeholders less concerned with most of those decisions. 
We thus see that each type of employee governance has some comparative advantages 
relative to the others, and all of them have the potential to allow employees to modify 
employment regulations to more effectively and cheaply protect themselves while also creating a 
bigger surplus to be shared with shareholders and other company stakeholders. One could allow 
use of only or two of these three types of governance as a way to allow employers to modify 
regulatory mandates, or try to fine tune the system to require employers to use one form of 
employee governance to modify some mandates but another form to modify other mandates. 
However, no one system of employee governance is superior enough to suggest privileging it 
over the others, so in our proposal we suggest allowing employers to use any one of the three 
types of employee governance as a way to modify regulatory mandates. 
IV. Moving from Mandates to Governance within the Employment Relationship
In this Part we set forth a plan for moving from a system largely built around mandatory 
employment terms to a system that provides for employee participation in firm governance.  We 
first establish the principles for directing such a move, and then examine concrete changes to 
employment regulation following from these principles.  We then discuss the implications of the 
move from mandates to governance for the increasingly prominent discussion of how to define 
who is an employee. 
A. Principles of a Governance Model for Employment
The regulation of employment is an incredibly complex endeavor, with many different
moving pieces.246  Below we provide a preliminary overview for a new approach with the 
guidance of certain principles. 
244 See supra Part II.B. 
245 See supra Part II.B. 
246 ESTLUND, supra note 8, at 11 (describing employment law as “an unruly hydra head of duties and 
liabilities for employers”). 
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First, we conceive of the “employer” as a business firm.  Labor and employment law has 
focused on the definition of employee and has largely neglected the concept of the employer.247  
But the concept of an “employer” is critical to the idea of employment regulation: the employer 
is the regulated entity.  The law tends to focus on the status of a business entity under 
organizational law: corporation, LLC, partnership, or other form.  But employers can be any of 
these; the critical aspect of being an employer is that employers enlist workers as part of ongoing 
business enterprise in which the workers participate.248  The economic literature defines such 
entities as firms and has devoted a subdiscipline of economics to why we have firms within 
larger markets.249  Employers are firms and are defined by their use of workers to carry on the 
ongoing enterprise of the firm.250 
By recognizing that employers are economic organizational entities, we should then 
understand the principle of self-governance within the organization.  The autocracy of the 
business firm has long been taken for granted.251  But democratic principles hold that members 
of an organizational unit should have a say in the governance of that unit.  These principles of 
participation, voice, and representation support a shift from regulatory mandates to employee 
governance.252 
Employee governance also provides the opportunity to pursue more efficient solutions, in 
an economic sense, by allowing the parties to determine the terms and conditions that best fit 
their situation. Employment mandates are based in part on paternalism: the idea that the 
government will mandate a better solution that the parties would reach on their own.253  Such 
paternalism may be necessary to protect employees who would otherwise lack bargaining 
power.254  But governance participation is designed to provide workers with more power to 
negotiate their own solutions.  The flexibility and specificity allowed in bargaining would allow 
the parties to achieve results that are more closely tailored to their individual interests and 
247 But see JEREMIAS PRASSL, THE CONCEPT OF THE EMPLOYER (2015). For a discussion of joint 
employment and employment fissuring, see  Andrew Elmore, Franchise Regulation for the Fissured 
Economy, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 907, 932-44 (2018).  
248 See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 706 
(2013). 
249 Coase, supra note 170. 
250 Id. at 403. 
251 Cynthia Estlund, Rethinking Autocracy at Work, 131 HARV. L. REV. 795 (2018) (“How is it that a 
democratic society devoted to individual freedom came to tolerate the private outposts of autocratic rule 
and unfreedom in which most citizens spend their working lives?”). 
252 See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 90, at 5-6 (discussing the importance of employee voice as a value). 
253 See, e.g., Jacob Goldin, Libertarian Quasi-Paternalism, 82 MO. L. REV. 669, 681-82 (2017) (arguing 
that mandates are paternalistic in that they assume that parties would otherwise consistently make the 
wrong choice). 
254 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 
412 (2020) (“Ordinary workers lack significant bargaining power because they face ‘asymmetric 
vulnerability’ vis-à-vis their employers: they need their employer more than their employer needs 
them.”). 
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utility.255  Private ordering has significant advantages when the parties are able to knowingly and 
freely negotiate for an outcome that best reflects their own preferences.256 
Finally, employee governance provides additional mechanisms for enforcement.  
Employment mandates are vulnerable to underenforcement, which has been a chronic problem 
even during Democratic administrations.257  Under the Bush Administration in the early 2000s, 
agencies devolved regulatory responsibilities to employers through self-regulation programs.258  
These programs allowed companies to opt out of certain regulatory requirements or inspections 
in exchange for voluntary compliance programs with reporting and monitoring.259  Although 
pitched as boosting enforcement while saving government funds, self-regulation was often 
criticized as regulatory abnegation.260  Employee participation in governance is critical to turning 
self-regulation programs into meaningful oversight with some teeth, rather than a way of 
claiming compliance while cutting agency funding.261 
These principles of representation, efficiency, and enforcement inform our approach to 
rethinking the employment relationship. We have discussed three different types of employee 
representation which may achieve these gains, in somewhat different ways: unionization, shop 
floor governance, and board representation.262 We have argued that an employer should be able 
to use any one of these three forms to modify regulatory mandates in ways allowed by our 
approach. A fully-developed proposal would need to specify rules that employers would need to 
follow for each type of governance in order to be able to opt out of regulations. The already well-
developed rules for determining union representation provide the needed framework for that 
form of representation. Shop floor and board representation need more development. This would 
require answering questions like what workers have voting rights in choosing representatives? 
Are those voting rights equal for full-time and part-time employees? Might employers be 
allowed or required to provide for classes of employee representatives, to take account of 
significant differences in the interests of different types of employees? Should there be a sunset 
time imposed for opting out of some regulations, so that the body opting out would need to re-
affirm that choice after a certain amount of time has passed? If so, how long should that time be? 
For some particularly important and sensitive opt outs, should one require a direct employee vote 
as well as approval by the representative body, and if so, for what regulations would that direct 
255 Lobel, supra note 10, at 408 (“In today's reality, no single model of work relations exists, and thus 
unitary conceptions of the workplace and unitary employment policies are impossible.”). 
256 See Blake D. Morant, Contractual Rules and Terms and the Maintenance of Bargains: The Case of the 
Fledgling Writer, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 453, 491 (1996) (noting that paternalism within 
contracts “can be costly, time consuming, and therefore, inefficient”). 
257 Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 319, 323 (2005) (“[B]oth employee rights and workplace regulations are often underenforced in the 
absence of union representation, especially where employers are committed to competing through the 
minimization of labor costs.”). 
258 Id. at 321 (discussing the movement toward self-regulation in the workplace).  
259 See generally Lobel, supra note 10, at 407-23 (discussing employer self-regulation). 
260 ESTLUND, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that employer compliance programs may be “mere window 
dressing—a glossy façade behind which business goes on as usual”). 
261 Id. at 242 (arguing that self-regulatory regimes need worker representation to be effective). 
262 See supra Part III. 
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vote requirement apply? These are just some of the more obvious and important questions that 
arise. 
At the same time, we recognize that mandates may continue to play an important role 
within certain contexts.  Mandates may make particular sense when there are public or third-
party interests that bargaining would not otherwise protect.  A mandate for a certain benefit may 
make sense if the public believes that people should have that benefit, even if they may not 
otherwise want to bargain for it (like health car insurance).  An employment mandate may be the 
most efficient way of providing that benefit for a large group of people, based on existing 
practices. Alternatively, in other cases the parties may have interests that are counter to those of 
society—for example, the exclusion of racial groups from a certain firm.  In these cases, society 
may wish to impose mandates not to supplement or protect the interests of workers, but rather to 
override their preferences in certain contexts. The choice is not simply between a mandatory rule 
or allowing an employee representative body to opt out of a regulation in any way it likes. One 
could allow employee representative bodies to change a regulatory provision, but impose limits 
on how far they can go. For instance, a union could be allowed to agree to an hourly wage below 
the statutory minimum wage, but only, say, $2 below that minimum.  
A final important principle we discuss in our proposal for moving from mandate to 
governance is the recognition that another key part of the design question is that some decisions 
may be removed from employers altogether and moved to the government level. For instance, 
health care and/or pensions may be provided by the government rather than private employers. 
Or, one may have a mixed system, with provision by both the state and by private employers. In 
that case, the choice of mandate versus governance within employers will depend in part upon 
whether there are means for social provision of the good in question. 
B. Moving from Mandates to Governance: Policy Proposals
The following proposals discuss specific areas of employment regulation that could be
reshaped under a regime of employee participation in governance. We do not discuss all areas of 
employment regulation mentioned above, and for those areas we do discuss we only present a 
highly skeletal outline of relevant considerations and possible approaches to how one might 
allow employers with employee participation to modify the regulation that applies to them. Still, 
we hope the discussion gives some sense of how our approach might work in practice. 
1. Compensation and Benefits
Employee governance rights would directly impact employees’ ability to negotiate for
better compensation.  The existence of a union wage premium is empirically established, as well 
as intuitively plausible; the Wagner Act’s preamble specifically states that the “inequality of 
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual 
liberty of contract . . . tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage 
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry.”263  The German system of 
codetermination has similarly shown demonstrable effects on workers’ compensation and 
263 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
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provides workers with a stronger presence within the firm.264  The combination of collective 
bargaining and governance power will address the growing imbalance between shareholders and 
workers, as evidenced by continued wage stagnation and growing corporate profits.265 
What mandates could be loosened in response to this change in governance power?  
Minimum wage is a significant candidate, as workers would have power to negotiate higher 
compensation for themselves or to tradeoff lower compensation for other items they value.266  
But society does have an interest in providing a minimum income allocated to each person—at 
least some threshold amount for working.  Firms may also take advantage of smaller subsets of 
workers and drive down their wages, even if the workers as a whole are empowered through 
governance.  In a firm, for example, where 80% of the workers are professionals and 20% are 
janitorial, the professional workers might join with management and shareholders to offer 
subminimum wages to the janitorial employees.  Society would still have an interest in 
establishing a minimum wage for those workers who might have less power within firms due to 
their market position or societal norms about the value of their labor. 
The societal interest in providing a minimum set of resources for all could be met in at 
least two ways. Most simply, one could set a floor on how low a worker representative body 
could set wages. This could create new potential compromises for increasing the minimum wage. 
Many consider the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 as much too low, with some cities 
recently moving to increase the minimum to $15. A compromise setting the default minimum at 
(say) $15 but allowing employers with employee governance to set the wage as low as (say) 
$7.25 might allow movement where none is currently achievable. The minimum wage could thus 
be used along the lines of a BATNA or penalty default that the parties could opt out of if they 
negotiated together.267  In the alternative,  government could itself provide a minimum level of 
264 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 235 (citing recent empirical studies). 
265 Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An explanation 
for the recent evolution of the American economy, NBER Working Paper 27193, Nov. 2020, 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193; Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 
45 STETSON L. REV. 69, 71 (2015) (“Workers need more power within the corporation to distribute the 
wealth generated by the corporation in a more equitable fashion.”). 
266 The suggestion to allow employers with a form of employee participation to be exempt from minimum 
wage requirements is not completely novel. Unions that supported a $15 minimum wage in Los Angeles 
also proposed that they be exempt from the requirement under some circumstances.  Jana Kasperkevic, 
LA unions call for exemption from $15 minimum wage they fought for, GUARDIAN.COM, April 12, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/12/los-angeles-15-dollar-minimum-wage-unions. 
267 BATNA refers to the “best alternative to a negotiated agreement.”  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, 
Fairness Beyond the Adversary System: Procedural Justice Norms for Legal Negotiation, 85 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2081, 2090 (2017).  A high minimum wage default would put employees in a much stronger
bargaining position—and not just with respect to wages.  See Russell Korobkin, Bargaining Power As
Threat of Impasse, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 867–68 (2004) (“[R]elative bargaining power stems entirely
from the negotiator's ability to, explicitly or implicitly, make a single threat credibly: ‘I will walk away
from the negotiating table without agreeing to a deal if you do not give me what I demand.’ The source of
the ability to make such a threat, and therefore the source of bargaining power, is the ability to project that
he has a desirable alternative to reaching an agreement, often referred to as a ‘BATNA.’”).  Similarly, a
penalty default motivates the parties to reach a negotiated outcome because of its harsh consequences on
one or both parties.  Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
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resources to all citizens as part of the social compact through a uniform basic income or negative 
income tax.  The United States already has variations on this type of entitlement for certain 
groups, such as Social Security for retirees and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) for low-income parents and children.268 But the considerable cost to the government to 
provide a true universal basic income makes it hard to achieve.269  
The concern about one class of workers taking advantage of another could be addressed 
by establishing different classes of representatives on the worker representative body, or by 
requiring a direct vote by different classes of workers in order to validate wages set below the 
statutory minimum.270 Of course, such protections increase the complication in devising a new 
system of regulation.  But such concerns are critical to the work of devising a workplace 
democracy that works as a democracy.271   
Pension benefits are already treated in good part as a social good, with public provision 
through Social Security. However, employers can and often do choose to provide additional 
retirement benefits to their employees. The law largely leaves to employers the decision whether 
to provide such benefits, and how much to provide if they do. Once the employer has promised a 
pension, ERISA does fairly strictly regulate the pension plans that employers do create, largely 
to ensure that the plans do deliver on their promises.272 A move from mandates to governance 
could conceivably allow employers who involve employees in governance greater flexibility in 
complying with ERISA, and indeed the statute does already exempt employers with unions from 
certain requirements.273 One should be quite careful in multiplying such exemptions, since the 
likelihood of a governmental bailout if employers default on pension obligations creates a 
serious moral hazard incentive. Still, perhaps there are some requirements that could be made 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one 
party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively 
the contract provision they prefer.”). 
268 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(3); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 , § 103 (1996) (creating TANF block 
grants in place of AFDC).  See Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism's Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 
1721, 1722–23 (2017) (discussing the failures of TANF’s implementation as a block grant program for 
states). 
269 The coronavirus pandemic has heightened calls for direct payments to people on a consistent monthly 
or weekly basis.  J. Edward Moreno, Lawmakers call for universal basic income amid coronavirus crisis, 
THE HILL, March 13, 2020, https://thehill.com/homenews/house/487485-lawmakers-call-for-economic-
stimulus-ubi-amid-coronavirus-crisis. For a discussion of former presidential candidate Andrew Yang’s 
UBI proposal, see Matt Stevens & Isabella Grullón Paz, Andrew Yang’s $1,000-a-Month Idea May Have 
Seemed Absurd Before. Not Now., N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/politics/universal-basic-income-andrew-yang.html. 
270 Direct votes might also be directed in specific cases of sub-minimum wages—for example, 
where the wages are set below a specified amount or where the gap between the lowest and 
highest paid workers within an employer are above a certain level. 
271 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES 68-71 (2019). 
272 See supra notes 25 through 34  and accompanying text. 
273 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 410(a)(26)(E) (exempting multiemployer plans that benefit only collective 
bargaining unit employees from certain minimum participation requirements); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)--
2(b)(7) (2012) (same). 
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more flexible with employee representation. One candidate would be ERISA’s requirement that 
plan fiduciaries focus exclusively on financial returns. With the rise of interest in sustainable 
investing, the Trump Administration’s Department of Labor sharply restricted the ability of plan 
fiduciaries to consider sustainability factors in making investment, even though beneficiaries 
may care about some social consequences of their investments.274 Most to the point of our 
analysis here, unions co-administering pensions may not want to invest in companies that engage 
in employment practices harmful to their members.275 By softening the profit-maximization 
principle, unions could better make tradeoffs between their obligations to current and future 
members with their fiduciary responsibilities to past members. 
The recent debates within the political parties over the provision of health insurance 
demonstrate its importance as a workplace benefit. Here again we see a mix of public provision 
and regulation of private provision. The United States does provide some governmental health 
insurance, primarily through Medicare and Medicaid, but it publicly insures fewer of its citizens 
than most wealthy countries.276 Many would like to change this and have the government 
provide health insurance to all. As a matter of employment regulation, this makes a good deal of 
sense—health insurance has a pretty weak connection to employment, and the American 
connection between employment and health insurance discourages mobility in labor markets and 
may make it harder for more marginal workers to get attractive jobs.277 However, the costs 
would be high and the politics are difficult.278 Absent a move to universal health insurance, 
would a move from mandates to governance suggest changes in the regulation of employer-
provided health insurance? The Affordable Care Act requires large enough employers to 
purchase health insurance for their employees, and imposes a range of requirements on what that 
274 Department of Labor, Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846 (effective 
Jan. 12, 2021). 
275 DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON 
37 (2018) (“[I]t is entirely appropriate for trustees to consider workers’ economic interests beyond just 
maximizing returns to the fund . . .”). 
276 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured: Lessons from 
International Experience with Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 424 (2001) (“As every observer 
of comparative health policy knows, we are the only developed nation on Earth that relies primarily on 
private health insurance to finance health care . . . .”); List of Countries with Universal Health Care, 
WIKIPEDIA (last checked February 8, 2021) 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_universal_health_care.  
277 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on Health Law 
and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 545 (2006) (“As health insurance has become more and more 
expensive, however, employers have found it increasingly difficult to pass on the cost of health insurance 
to workers through holding down wage growth, as they have largely done in the past.”).  In 2018, the 
average annual premium for employer-based family coverage was $19,616 for single coverage, and 
premiums rose to $6,896.  National Conference of State Legislatures, Health Insurance: Premiums and 
Increases, https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance-premiums.aspx (last checked Feb. 8, 
2021).  
278 But see Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment, 108 GEO. L.J. 
495, 502 (2020) (“[I]n 2020, even though the ACA itself does not achieve universal health coverage, it 
has made that goal not only seem feasible and politically possible for the first time in modern American 
history but also, to many, now the marker of a just healthcare system.”). 
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insurance must cover.279 Should employers with employee governance be allowed to waive some 
of those requirements? There are some arguments for that—the ACA requirements impose a 
pretty high level of coverage, which may be more costly than some employees  want given the 
opportunity costs. Unions and internal governance mechanisms are better positioned than 
individual employees to evaluate the value of complicated insurance plans, which may mitigate 
the costs associated with greater flexibility about plan policies.  
2. Workplace safety
Employers have both common law and statutory requirements to provide a safe
workplace.280 The OSHA regulations are detailed and onerous, and a prime target for allowing 
modification by employers with employee governance. Although workers are not aware of all 
relevant safety risks, they do learn a lot about hazards on the job. The collective organization that 
comes with employee governance would cast a wider and tighter net for this information, pulling 
it all together for deeper examination. And while many workplaces may be dangerous, most 
workplace dangers are more limited to workers themselves.281 Indeed, employers with adequate 
internal compliance programs already can receive less stringent enforcement supervision under 
some federal and state workplace safety initiatives,282 one of the existing practices that serves as 
a model for our approach to providing more regulatory flexibility to employers with good 
internal practices. The keys are that: (1) workers must have authentic power—not window 
dressing, and (2) agencies must still provide expertise and oversight for those dangers than 
unions do not have the resources to monitor. 
Employers with worker governance should be permitted to go beyond lighter supervision 
practices to allowing employers to modify some substantive restrictions on workplace safety. 
Although any of the three forms of employee governance should be able to invoke the ability to 
modify regulations, one common suggestion is the use of work safety committees.283 We would 
not grant carte blanche. Regulation should provide a hard floor of standards below which no 
employer may fall.  
In response to the debate over employer liability for infections during the Covid-19 
pandemic, we suggested a possible proposal: employers following a Covid-19 safety plan that 
had been approved by its employees and met threshold CDC requirements would have a defense 
to a tort or workers compensation claim from employees who claim to have been affected at that 
workplace.284 
279 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 46 through 49 and accompanying text. 
281 Noam Scheiber, Biden Tells OSHA to Issue New Covid-19 Guidance to Employers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/21/business/economy/biden-osha-coronavirus.html 
(example of dangers at meatpacking plants). 
282 See supra  notes 131 through 132 and accompanying text. 
283 BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 90, at 162-64; ESTLUND, supra note 8, at 174-78. 
284 Brett McDonnell & Matt Bodie, To reopen the economy, businesses need a ‘safe haven’ protocol to 
avoid liability, STARTRIBUNE (May 27, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/to-reopen-the-economy-
businesses-need-a-safe-haven-protocol-to-avoid-liability/570815432/. 
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3. Limits on discipline and termination
The common law employment at will doctrine provides little protection for employees,285
and hence little scope for using employee governance to reduce the scope of regulation. The 
common law does prohibit employers from firing an employee who refused to violate the law or 
professional codes of conduct in ways that injure or risk injury to third parties.286 Since those 
restrictions protect third parties, employers with employee governance should not be able to 
avoid them. 
The extensive modern statutory prohibitions on discrimination in termination and other 
employment practices287 raise rather different considerations. These prohibitions are in the first 
instance about protecting employees, and hence it could be argued that employees acting 
collectively should be able to limit those protections if they so choose. As a society, however, we 
understand discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and so forth as categorical social evils. 
Moreover, these protections are often counter-majoritarian in nature, and worker governance is 
not immune to the influence of bias, discrimination, and bigotry against minority groups. While 
labor organizations have often served as forces for empowerment for workers of color, they have 
also served as tools of oppression.288  Unions, employee directors, or general works councils are 
all highly problematic, as they are chosen by all employees collectively, not just by those who 
belong to groups vulnerable to discrimination. 
One possible policy respond is to incorporate governance power for organizations 
representing vulnerable groups. As it happens, versions of such organizations are quite common 
in contemporary large corporations, most have which have a number of employee resource or 
affinity groups based on the main categories of antidiscrimination law, such as race, gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, and veteran status.289 These organizations typically have no formal 
authority within a firm. However, one could imagine giving them formal oversight responsibility 
of some sort over alleged discriminatory practices within a firm. Because of our first concern 
above, we don’t think that even effective, empowered affinity groups should be able to waive 
antidiscrimination prohibitions. But perhaps where such organizations are adequately 
empowered and represent enough employees of a protected category within a firm, that might 
create some presumptive evidence of legal compliance by the firm that could aid it in responding 
to complaints of discrimination.  Our proposal would tread hesitantly here, but perhaps 
antidiscrimination law could be tailored to encourage empowerment of affinity groups as it has 
been used to encourage in-house antiharassment reporting and correction programs.290    
285 See supra notes 35 through 40 and accompanying text 
286 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 41 through 42 and accompanying text. 
288 Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives' Passion for the Unattainable, 94 VA. L. REV. 495, 500-01 
(2008) (discussing the history of segregation in labor unions); see also RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST 
PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007). 
289 See Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in Silicon Valley: Networks, Ethnic Organization, and New 
Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 510-17 (2002) (discussing employee affinity groups). 
290 We tread hesitantly in part because of the mixed and uncertain evidence regarding the success of 
internal compliance programs designed to address instances of workplace sexual harassment. See Joanna 
L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual
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C. Boundaries of Employment
As platform companies like Uber, Lyft, and Doordash have endeavored to redefine the scope 
of employment, their growth poses challenges for our employee-oriented approach. Recent 
developments in California illustrate the difficulty in assuming that broad categorization will 
take care of the problem. California has earned its reputation as a state with an employee-friendly 
approach to labor and employment law.  In the mid-20th Century, the California Supreme Court 
established much more lenient approaches to implied-in-fact employment contracts,291 as well as 
the use of good faith to protect employee expectations.292  Although these doctrines have been 
scaled back,293 the state still has an array of unique approaches to employment regulation, 
including a high minimum wage,294 mandated break times,295 paid sick leave,296 and the 
provision of safety equipment.297  Critically, California had also moved to protect these 
protections against employer work-arounds by broadening its definition of “employee,” first in a 
state supreme court decision298 and then by statute.299  However, California voters have upended 
this framework by voting decisively in favor of Proposition 22, which removes certain platform 
workers from the employment category.  Even with Democratic control of the state government, 
the difficulties in reversing a voter proposition mean that the new system is in place for the 
foreseeable future. And companies such as Uber and Lyft have designs on bringing their 
recategorization of platform workers to states across the nation.300 
Drivers at ride-sharing companies and other platform workers present a challenge that 
goes beyond the definition of “employee”. They are part of a broader trend of disintermediation 
or fissuring in many companies and industries.301 Workers are more loosely connected to the 
Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (2003).  For proposals regarding liability approaches, see 
Timothy P. Glynn, Taking Self-Regulation Seriously: High-Ranking Officer Sanctions for Work-Law 
Violations, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 279 (2011); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational 
Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 574 (2005). 
291 Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(finding evidence of implied-in-fact contractual agreement for termination protections), disapproved of by 
Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (2000). 
292 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 397 (Cal. 1988). 
293 Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000). 
294 California minimum wage is $14 for employers with more than 25 employees as of 1/1/2021, 
increasing to $15/hour in 2022.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.12(b)(1).  The minimum wage for employers 
with 25 or fewer employees is $13 per hour, rising to $15 per hour in 2023.  Id.§ 1182.12(b)(2). 
295 CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.7. 
296 California Chapter 317, 2014 Laws (Assembly Bill 1522): Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act 
of 2014, CAL. LAB. CODE § 245(e). 
297 CAL. LAB. CODE § 6401 (providing that employers must furnish employees with appropriate safety 
equipment). 
298 Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). 
299 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 296 (West) (Assembly Bill No. 5). 
300 See Press, supra note 4; Hawkins, supra note 489. 
301 Tanya Goldman & David Weil, Who’s Responsible Here? Establishing Legal Responsibility in the 
Fissured Workplace; , 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105 (2019). Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm 
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businesses for which they work. They are more temporary, and more interchangeable. They have 
less employment security and typically receive fewer benefits. This trend is responsible for the 
ongoing pressure on the definition of “employees,” but it is also discouraging for anyone who, 
like us, envisions a world where workers play a central role in their workplace, and where a 
person’s job is personally and professionally as well as financially fulfilling for a greater 
percentage of workers. How can employment law respond to this challenge?  Does our proposed 
move from mandates to governance present a partial response, or is our proposal itself threatened 
by the move to fissured workplaces? 
The answer is some of both, as we can see by applying the employment and corporate 
law arguments we surveyed in Parts I and II to platform companies. Consider first the arguments 
within employment law. On the one hand, the need for regulation302 is often at least as strong for 
protecting those working for companies like Uber as it is for other employees. With their weaker 
ties to the company, platform workers are likely to be even more limited in access to important 
information.303 They also face stronger obstacles to internal collective action,304 as they interact 
with each other less on the job. The tendency to receive fewer benefits, such as pensions or 
health insurance, also creates more problems for taxpayers.305 
On the other hand, the costs of our current complex system of employment regulation306 
are also greater for platform companies like Uber. Major elements of that employment regulation 
genuinely do not fit well with the circumstances of many platform workers. For example, 
required health care provision might not match up for those Uber and Lyft drivers who only 
work for the companies sporadically.307 There is greater heterogeneity among many platform 
workers as well. Some Uber and Lyft drivers prefer to work only part-time at hours they 
determine, while others need it as a full-time job. Their preferences as to how hours and wage 
regulation should apply to their jobs are likely to diverge significantly (which may be part of the 
reason that the California ballot initiative succeeded).308 Thus, while the need for protection 
remains strong for platform workers, the inadequacy of a one-size-fits all set of rule is severe. 
The arguments for allowing firms with employee involvement to opt out of some rules,309 
creating space for more nuanced regulation that better fits the needs of both firms and workers, 
are thus particularly strong for businesses like Uber. 
But some of the corporate governance-based arguments for encouraging employee 
involvement in governance face a serious challenge from fissured workplaces. Some of the 
Exemption, 82 L. & CONTEM. PROB. 65 (2019); June Carbone, Naomi Kahn, & Nancy Levit, Women, 
Rule-Breaking, and the Triple Bind, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105 (2019). 
302 See supra Part I.D. 
303 See supra notes 119 through 121 and accompanying text. 
304 See supra notes 125 through 126 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra notes 127 through 128 and accompanying text. 
306 See supra Part I.C. 
307 ALEX ROSENBLAT, UBERLAND 58 (2018) (discussing Uber’s estimate that most of its drivers are part-
time earners). 
308 Preetika Rana, How California’s Prop 22 Affects Lyft and Uber Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2020) 
(Uber driver says “I used to work for a company, if I asked for a one-month vacation, they said no, but 
now I can have a two month vacation, a three month vacation, that’s why I like it.”) 
309 See supra Part I.E. 
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strongest arguments for employee governance stem from the centrality of employees to firms, 
and that centrality is weakened by disintermediation. Platform workers are less tied to specific 
schedules and may work for a variety of different apps in the course of a day.310 Their 
disconnection from a traditional firm means that they are in fact more like free agents and less 
likely to be plugged into a worker information network.311 There may also be more heterogeneity 
in the interests of ride-sharing drivers,312 for whom that work plays quite different roles in their 
lives. With their weakened attachment to the firm, platform workers may also take a more short-
term perspective on firm decisions. For these reasons, it is less clear that employee involvement 
in governance is desirable in platform companies. 
On the other hand, some of the corporate governance arguments for employee 
involvement still apply at firms like Uber, perhaps even with greater strength. The weak 
attachment to the company may reduce worker satisfaction and fulfillment; participating in 
governance may help counteract that problem.313 Also, note that Uber, the leading example of a 
platform company, has not exactly been a model of good corporate governance, and its various 
scandals have hurt Uber’s stockholders and customers as well as its workers.314 Although Uber’s 
drivers may not be as well-informed about the business as better-integrated employees are, their 
involvement in governance, particularly if through electing board representatives, may still 
provide a useful check on management that would improve corporate governance for all 
stakeholders.315 
Though the arguments are thus ambivalent, we think that on balance the move from 
mandates to governance could help address the challenge of fissured workplaces. Should other 
state or federal regulators choose to broaden the definition of employee along the lines of 
California’s AB 5,316 the ability to evade some of the costs of the resulting applicable regulations 
by adopting employee governance could avoid some of the problems of such a revised definition. 
Rather than having a chunky off/on button as to the application of employment mandates, 
governance mechanisms could allow workers to negotiate with platform companies for a more 
tailored set of terms.  This flexibility might have particular pull in the gig economy, where at 
least some segment of workers do in fact want nontraditional work arrangements.  This 
compromise might stop the ongoing legal warfare over employment coverage; the companies 
may have won the Prop 22 battle, but there are 49 more states and a variety of federal statutes 
that could easily be read to render these workers employees.  Plus, employment status would put 
the companies and workers in better stead with respect to antitrust law, which might otherwise 
310 See supra notes 170 through 174 and accompanying text. 
311 See supra notes 175 through 177 and accompanying text. 
312 See supra notes 182 through 184 and accompanying text. 
313 See supra notes 179 through 181 and accompanying text. 
314 Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays With Fire, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-
precipice.html. 
315 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
316 See 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 296 (West) (Assembly Bill No. 5). 
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implicate these companies in widespread price-fixing.317  Creative solutions are needed, and 
governance rights combined with negotiating flexibility hold some promise as a reasonable place 
for the parties to meet. 
Conclusion 
The United States has responded to the increasing disempowerment and disconnectedness 
of its workforce through piecemeal federal and state mandates designed to address particular 
workplace or societal problems.  While these legislative efforts may ameliorate harsh aspects of 
the employment relationship, they do not address the underlying cause: the lack of worker power 
to participate in workplace governance.  Policymakers need to look beyond labor and 
employment law to the internal power structure within the organization, where employees have 
been shut out.  A change in governance rights for workers would shift the balance of power back 
toward the middle and provide the opportunity for workers to participate in difficult firm 
choices.  
Our proposal replies to the main concern of corporate leaders and legal scholars who are 
skeptical of legal approaches like codetermination in Germany that mandate employee 
involvement in governance. They argue that corporate governance should be about protecting 
shareholders,318 and that employees (like other stakeholders) should be protected in other areas 
of the law. But corporate law scholars pay little attention to the rigid mandates and complexities 
of employment law, a style of regulation that contradicts the core values of U.S. business 
association law with its emphasis on flexibility and choice. We would offer businesses a new 
option, expanding who gets represented in corporate governance in exchange for more flexibility 
in employment law. If that choice does not improve life for both companies and their employees, 
they need not adopt it. 
Employment mandates have inherent limitations that can hurt both employees and their 
employers.  Our system needs worker power so that firms and workers rely less on external 
regulation and more on internal governance. 
317 See Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber As for-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 
38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 233 (2017); see also Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust As Allocator of 
Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. 378 (2020). 
318 For reasons discussed in Part II.A. 
                                                       
